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This dissertation contains three essays in applied microeconomics. In the first chapter paper 
I test whether the return to college education is the result of human capital accumulation or 
instead reflects the fact that attending college signals higher ability to employers. I exploit a 
reform at Universidad de los Andes, which in 2006 reduced the amount of coursework required 
to earn degrees in economics and business by 20% and 14%, respectively, but did not change 
the quality of incoming or graduating students. The size of the entering class, their average 
high school exit exam scores, and graduation rates were not affected by the reform, indicating 
that selection of students into the degrees remained the same. Using administrative data on 
wages and college attendance, I estimate that wages fell by approximately 16% in economics 
and 13% in business. These results suggest that human capital plays an important role in the 
determination of wages and reject a pure signaling model. Surveying employers, I find that the 
reduction in wages may have resulted from a decline in performance during the recruitment 
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process, which led students to be placed in lower-quality firms. Using data from the recruitment 
process for economists at the Central Bank of Colombia, I find that the reform reduced the 
probability of Los Andes graduates’ being hired by 17 percentage points. The second chapter 
provides evidence that parental incarceration increases children's educational attainment. I 
collect criminal records for 90,000 low-income parents who have been convicted of a crime in 
Colombia, and combine it with administrative data on the educational attainment of their 
children. I exploit exogenous variation in parental incarceration resulting from the random 
assignment of defendants to judges with different propensities to convict and incarcerate. I find 
that conditional on conviction, parental incarceration increases education by 0.7 years for 
children whose parents are on the margin of incarceration. This positive effect is larger for 
boys, violent crimes, and cases in which the incarcerated parent is the mother. Finally, in the 
third chapter I derive a new expression that extends the Local Average Treatment Effect 
concept, to a setting with two sources of unobserved treatment heterogeneity.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Effect of Human Capital on Earnings: 
Evidence from a Reform at Colombia’s Top 
University 
Carolina Arteaga1, UCLA 
 
In this paper I test whether the return to college education is the result of human capital accumulation 
or instead reflects the fact that attending college signals higher ability to employers. I exploit a reform 
at Universidad de los Andes, which in 2006 reduced the amount of coursework required to earn 
degrees in economics and business by 20% and 14%, respectively, but did not change the quality of 
incoming or graduating students. The size of the entering class, their average high school exit exam 
scores, and graduation rates were not affected by the reform, indicating that selection of students into 
                                                          
1 Department of Economics, UCLA. Contact information: caroartc@ucla.edu. I am grateful to the Colombian Ministry of 
Education, the Central Bank of Colombia, and the Economics Department at Universidad de los Andes for providing the data 
for this study. I would like to thank Magne Mogstad and two anonymous referees for their excellent comments. I am extremely 
grateful to Adriana Lleras-Muney for her encouragement and suggestions. I also want to thank David Atkin, Leah Boustan, 
Moshe Buchinsky, Michela Giorcelli, Carlos Medina, Maurizio Mazzocco, Rodrigo Pinto, Sarah Reber, Juan E. Saavedra, 
Andres Santos, and Till von Wachter for their comments and feedback. I am grateful to my colleagues Pasha Andreyanov, 
Tiago Caruso, Richard Domurat, Keyoung Lee, Rustin Partow, and Maria Lucia Yanguas for insightful suggestions and 
discussions. I thank seminar participants at UCLA, SOLE, LACEA, EBE, Universidad de Los Andes and the Central Bank of 
Colombia for valuable comments. 
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the degrees remained the same. Using administrative data on wages and college attendance, I estimate 
that wages fell by approximately 16% in economics and 13% in business. These results suggest that 
human capital plays an important role in the determination of wages and reject a pure signaling model. 
Surveying employers, I find that the reduction in wages may have resulted from a decline in 
performance during the recruitment process, which led students to be placed in lower-quality firms. 
Using data from the recruitment process for economists at the Central Bank of Colombia, I find that 
the reform reduced the probability of Los Andes graduates’ being hired by 17 percentage points. 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Education is one of the most important determinants of wages at the individual level. Returns to 
a year of schooling are estimated to be positive and large in most countries, ranging from 2% to 
20% around the world (Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014). Moreover, the earnings premium 
associated with college has risen substantially in the last decades (Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 
2013). There is less consensus about the mechanisms through which education leads to higher 
wages. Studies that estimate causal returns to schooling cannot shed light on the sources of such 
returns (Card, 2001). Two main channels have been proposed in the literature. First, the human 
capital theory argues that education increases productivity and wages rise as a result (Becker, 
1964 and Mincer, 1974). Second, the signaling theory posits that higher wages reflect the 
correlation between education and unobserved ability.2 In both settings, higher-ability workers 
                                                          
2 Of course, the two theories are not mutually exclusive. 
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obtain higher levels of schooling and are paid more, which explains the difficulty in setting the 
two theories apart. 
In this paper, I identify the effect of human capital accumulation on wages, separate from 
that of signaling, by exploiting a curriculum change at Universidad de los Andes, the top 
university in Colombia. In 2006, the number of credits required to earn a college degree in 
economics and business decreased by 20% and 14%, respectively. This was accomplished by 
dropping 12 required courses in economics and 6 in business, and a reduction in instruction time 
from 4.5 to 4 years.3 The identification strategy of this paper relies on the fact that the reform did 
not alter the selection of entering or graduating students. At Los Andes, the admission process is 
constrained by a limited number of slots and is solely based on scores on the national standardized 
high school exit exam (the Saber 11). I show that the size of the entering class did not grow, nor 
did average entrance test scores decrease, and dropout rates did not change with the reduction in 
the number of classes. Therefore, the reform had no short-run effect on the quality of the entering 
class after 2006, but it decreased human capital accumulation. The human capital model predicts 
a decline in wages as a result of the reform, whereas a pure signaling model does not.  
To estimate the effect of the reform, I use individual information on wages and 
educational attainment in a difference-in-differences (DID) framework. I compare wages in the 
formal sector before and after the reform for economics and business graduates of Los Andes 
and other top-10 schools in Colombia that did not reform their degrees. I find that after the reform, 
wages for students from Los Andes decreased by 16% in economics and 13% in business. This 
                                                          
3 In economics, the change in curriculum not only reduced the number of semesters, but also the number of courses per 
semester. Before the reform, students were expected to take six courses per term; this was changed to five. In business, the 
number of classes per term remained at five. 
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suggests that human capital accumulation plays an important role in the determination of wages, 
and therefore I reject a model in which signaling is the only role of college education. Allowing 
for heterogeneous effects of the reform (using Athey and Imbens’ (2006) changes-in-changes 
estimator), I find a homogenous impact along the wage distribution; this indicates that wages 
declined proportionally for high- and low-earners.  
I investigate the mechanisms that led to lower wages. Using data for economics graduates 
from Los Andes, I find that the distribution of employers changed with the reform, and that the 
likelihood of being employed by the highest-paying firms decreased. Moreover, I find that there 
is a relationship between the classes dropped and the placement of graduates across employers. 
Using data from the recruitment process for economists at the Central Bank from 2008 to 2014, 
I find that for graduates of Los Andes, the probability of being hired fell by 17 percentage points 
after the reform. This suggests that the reduction in courses introduced by the reform, decreased 
students’ performance in recruitment processes, which in turn placed them in lower-quality firms 
and ultimately decreased their wages. Given that initial firm placement plays a significant role in 
determining long-term labor market success (Oreopoulus, von Wacther and Heisz, 2012), my 
results could also hint at possible longer-term effects. These results, however, are not estimates 
of the internal rate of returns to investment in additional schooling, but simply the effect on wages 
early in people’s careers.  
Finally, I examine possible threats to my identification strategy. First, it could be that the 
curriculum reform changed the pool of applicants and entrants in dimensions that are not captured 
by the Saber 11, but are relevant to the labor market. Specifically, given the decline in 
requirements for graduation, lower-ability individuals should be induced to enroll in these 
programs, which would lead to a decrease in the value of the signal and in wages. To address this 
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concern, I estimate an alternative specification, taking as the treatment group students at Los 
Andes who were already enrolled at the time of the reform but studied under the new curriculum. 
Results for this alternative treatment group are similar to the baseline specification. Second, my 
estimates might capture a negative trend in the return to a degree from Los Andes. To test whether 
this is the case, I perform two exercises: First, I replicate my baseline estimation using a placebo 
date for the reform, and second, I test my specification using a major at Los Andes that did not 
undergo a curriculum reform. I do not find evidence of wage changes in either case. My results 
are robust to several additional checks explained in the robustness section. Lastly, to interpret the 
reduction in wages as the causal effect of human capital, the choices underlying labor force 
participation should be unaffected by the reform. To check that this is the case, I estimate the 
effect of the reform on the probability of being employed in the formal sector. I find that for both 
economics and business the effects is very close to zero and statistically insignificant.  
This paper contributes to the literature by estimating the effect of human capital 
accumulation on wages, separate from that of signaling, in a college setting. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is also the first paper to investigate the mechanisms that led to changes in wages; 
as a result, the study provides important information about the tools employers use to learn about 
workers’ expected productivity. 
A number of papers have investigated this issue in primary and secondary education 
settings and obtained mixed results. Eble and Hu (2016) exploit the introduction of one extra 
year in primary school in China in 1980 and find a 2% increase in wages. Since this accounts for 
a small fraction of the overall return to schooling, they conclude that there is an important role 
for signaling in primary education, however, no extra coursework was introduced in that 
additional year. Lang and Kropp (1986) and Bedard (2001) find secondary schooling decisions 
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that are consistent with a signaling model and would reject a pure human capital framework. 
Another strand of the literature attempts to directly measure whether there is a signaling value to 
academic degrees. Tyler, Murnane, and Willett (2000) estimate the signaling value of the GED 
to be between 12% and 20%, whereas Clark and Martorell (2014) find little evidence of high 
school diploma signaling effects.  
Finally, my results suggest that human capital accumulation is an important explanation 
for the returns to college education. This finding relates to a growing literature that estimates the 
returns to different types of post-secondary education by separating the effect of the institution 
versus the field of study. This literature suggests that what matters the most is the type of degree 
as opposed to the institution from which it was obtained (Dale and Krueger 2002, Kirkeboen et 
al. 2016, and Hastings et al. 2013). This paper contributes by providing evidence that suggests 
that the source of heterogeneity in returns may be due to the different sets of skills and knowledge 
acquired in each degree, and not to differences in selectivity. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a simplified version of 
a signaling and human capital model to derive testable implications in my context. Section 3 
discusses the curriculum reform at Los Andes, and Section 4 describes the data, empirical 
strategy, and results. In Section 5, I explore the mechanisms that explain my results. Section 6 
presents robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes. 
1.2  Theoretical framework 
In this section I lay out a simple model that allows me to derive a test of the signaling and 
human capital theories by exploiting a curriculum reduction at a top university, in a context of 
ability-based admissions and a binding number of slots. 
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Individuals have ability 𝜃𝑖 distributed with continuous support. There are J schools that 
offer different levels of human capital accumulation 𝑓𝑗, where j indicates school ranking. The 
cost to attend school j for individual i increases with the level of human capital and decreases 
with the level of ability, such that 𝑐(𝑓𝑗 , 𝜃𝑖) > 𝑐(𝑓𝑘, 𝜃𝑖) for every i when 𝑗 < 𝑘, that is, when j 
offers higher human capital than k, and 𝑐(𝑓𝑗 , 𝜃𝑖) < 𝑐(𝑓𝑗 , 𝜃𝑚) when 𝜃𝑖 > 𝜃𝑚. In addition, 
𝜕2𝑐(𝑓,𝜃)
𝜕𝑓𝜕𝜃
< 0, meaning that the cost of attending harder schools increases less for higher-ability 
individuals. 
Suppose that productivity is a linear function of ability and human capital such that for a 
given set of beliefs regarding the assignment of students to colleges, expected productivity takes 
the form in equation (1).  
 𝑤𝑗 = 𝜇(𝐸[𝜃𝑖|𝑓𝑗], 𝑓𝑗) = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2?̅?𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑓𝑗               (1) 
These beliefs are written 𝐸[𝜃𝑖|𝑓𝑗] ≡ 𝜃𝑗,̅  where 𝜃𝑗, is decreasing in j (i.e., firms believe that 
average ability is greater in higher-ranked colleges), and firms observe the level of instruction 𝑓𝑗 . 
In a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, agents signal their type, and firms predict ability 
based on the observed level of human capital and offer wages accordingly. Students choose the 
school j that maximizes wages net of effort costs: 
             𝑤𝑗 − 𝑐(𝑓𝑗 , 𝜃𝑖) = 𝜇(𝐸[𝜃𝑖|𝑓𝑗], 𝑓𝑗) − 𝑐(𝑓𝑗 , 𝜃𝑖)       (2) 
Thus, a student chooses to attend the top school whenever: 
        𝑤1 − 𝑤2 ≥ 𝑐(𝑓1, 𝜃𝑖) − 𝑐(𝑓2, 𝜃𝑖)                 (3) 
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The left-hand side of (3) is a positive constant, whereas the right-hand side is decreasing in 𝜃𝑖. 
Then, there exists a unique 𝜃1 such that ∀𝜃 ≥ 𝜃1 (3) will hold (see Appendix 1 for the proof and 
a simple example). Subsequently, there is a threshold θ for each pair of schools that determines 
school choice over the school’s ranking. 
In this framework, the question of signaling vs. human capital comes down to learning about 
the values of 𝛼2?̅? and 𝛼3𝑓 in (1). To identify the contribution of human capital to wages, we need 
variation in 𝑓 that holds 𝜃 constant. If school No.1 reduces the quantity of human capital 
produced, (∆𝑓1 < 0), such that it is still higher than 𝑓2, this model would predict that since the 
effort required to attend school No.1 went down, the level of ability that determines for whom it 
is profitable to attend the best school would also decrease, and thus ?̅?1 would decrease, and the 
fall in wages will confound the effects of the decline in the average ability of students and the 
decline in learning: ∆𝑤1 = 𝛼2∆?̅?1 + 𝛼3∆𝑓1. Note, however, that in an environment in which 
school No.1:  
i) Is constrained to admit a certain maximum number of students.  
ii) Uses a proxy of ability to determine admissions.   
iii) The maximum number of students is binding before the curriculum change.  
Then: 
By selecting students based on test scores the admissions criteria guarantee that the 
quality of the admitted class will not be affected by the reform, because the school 
was already choosing a subset (i.e., those with highest ability) of the group of 
applicants who find it profitable to attend school No. 1. 
And thus: 
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∆𝑤1 = 𝛼3∆𝑓1    (4) 
If 𝛼3 is zero, the data support a pure signaling model in which wages are solely 
determined by the school’s average student ability; see equation (1). If 𝛼3 is statistically different 
from zero, this suggests a role for human capital in the determination of wages. In the next 
section, I will review the assumptions that lead to this result. 
1.3  Institutional background and reform 
I will first describe the salient characteristics of Colombian education and labor market 
institutions and details of the curriculum reform. On the education front, college admissions 
occur twice a year. Students apply directly to a major, and the gross enrollment rate in higher 
education is around 39%. Regarding the labor market, recent graduates are typically recruited 
year-round, and only a few multinational companies have a formal recruitment season. 
Recruitment at this level usually consists of tests of specific knowledge, standard human 
resources selection tests, and interviews. Twenty-five percent of college graduates work in the 
informal sector. Los Andes is a private university, and is ranked first in Colombia. 
 
1.3.1   Reform 
In 2006, Los Andes unilaterally decided to reduce the coursework required to earn a 
degree in most of its majors.4 The reasons given for the reform were to move towards 
international standards of shorter college degrees and to encourage graduate study. Each 
department was autonomous in implementing the reform. In this paper, I exploit the reforms 
                                                          
4 Los Andes was the only school to implement this practice at the time. 
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implemented by the economics and business departments. These consisted solely of a reduction 
in required credits; in other departments, the change led to the complete overhaul of curricula. In 
economics, the curriculum was trimmed by 12 courses (20% of the total number of credits), 
which resulted in a median number of five courses per term instead of six. Specifically, the 
reform: (i) took six mandatory courses and change them to optional courses (Monetary Policy, 
Public Finance, Trade, Marxist Economics, Colombian Economic Policy, and Social Programs 
Evaluation); (ii) reduced the number of optional courses by four; (iii) combined two probability 
and statistics courses into one; and (iv) combined accounting and economic measurement courses 
into one. The business department eliminated Computer Programming, Simulations, and 
Microeconomics I. In addition, the requirement of six upper-division electives was reduced to 
three. For both majors, instruction time was reduced from 4.5 years to 4 years. 
 
The reform affected new students and students who, at the time it was implemented, were 
beginning their second year or earlier for economics, and in their third year or earlier for business. 
Other enrolled students were not affected by the change. 
 
1.3.2  First stage: Empirical evidence of the reform for economics and business 
 
To separately estimate the effects of human capital from that of signaling, I need an 
effective decline in the number of terms studied and credits earned, with no changes in the 
quantity or quality of the pool of students graduating from Los Andes. To investigate these points, 
in this section I present data on aggregate statistics from Los Andes’ annual bulletins and micro 
data on credits earned by economics students.  
11 
 
Was the reform effective? 
 
Figure 1 shows the average duration of undergraduate programs for both economics and 
business majors. There is a step down in these trends of about one semester at the time of the 
reform, which suggests that the reform was effective in decreasing the average length of the 
program. For economics, the average duration went from 5 to 4.5 years, and for business duration 
declined from 5.5 to 5 years. Figure 2 shows the number of credits students graduated with in 
economics. We can observe a sharp drop at the time of the reform of around 16%. Table 1 shows 
regression estimates from fitting different linear trends around the reform. 
 
Did the reform affect the size and composition of the entering and graduating classes? 
 
To evaluate this question, I check the evolution of the size of the entering classes, their 
average Saber 11 scores, and average graduation rates. Panel a of Figure 3 shows the evolution 
of the entering class in economics and business. I fit different trends before and after the reform. 
The graph shows that the number of entering students was not affected by the reform.5 Panel b 
of Figure 3 shows the average Saber 11 scores of the entering class. Fitted regressions around 
the reform do not suggest a change in the quality of the entering class. I also perform a DID 
estimation, similar to the one I perform for my baseline analysis, to determine whether the reform 
reduced the average Saber 11 score. Specifically, I compare Saber 11 scores for incoming cohorts 
                                                          
5 Even though I do not find a discontinuity in test scores, there is a change in trends around the time of the reform. This could 
be problematic for my identification strategy if the control group does not experience the same change in trend as Los Andes. 
To check for this possibility, Figure A1.2 shows Saber 11 scores for entering cohorts at Rosario University and reveals a 
similar pattern. 
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before and after the reform for Los Andes and other Top 10 schools. Table A2.1 shows that there 
is no evidence of a reduction in scores after the reform at Los Andes.  
On the other hand, if the change in curricula alters the quantity of students graduating 
from Los Andes, the value of the signal would change. This is plausible, since the requirements 
to graduate decreased with the reform. Panel c of Figure 3 shows the evolution of graduation 
rates and suggests that the reform had no effect on the dropout rate. I also perform a DID linear 
probability model regression to test whether the reform changed the probability of graduating 
with an economics or business degree, and do not find evidence that it did (Table A2.1). Figure 
A3.1 also shows that the reform did not change the share of students who graduated with a minor.  
In the model, students use school rankings to choose which college to attend; if the reform 
decreased Los Andes’ ranking, post-reform cohorts would have, on average, lower ability. Even 
though the above doesn’t provide evidence of this, I examine this point directly by looking at 
rankings and college exit exam scores. International rankings that include Latin American 
universities are only available since 2013, but from 2013 to 2016, Los Andes has been ranked as 
the best school in Colombia.6 The Colombian Ministry of Education released its first rankings in 
2015, in which it also ranked Los Andes first.7 
To summarize, the reduced curriculum translated into an effective cut of one semester 
from the average degree duration for economics and business and a reduction in the number of 
credits per term; this constitutes an exogenous reduction in human capital. On the other hand, the 
number of new students, Saber 11 scores, and dropout rates suggest that the quantity and quality 
                                                          
6 https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2015/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25 
http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/latin-american-university-
rankings/2014#sorting=rank+region=+country=+faculty=+stars=false+search= 
Accessed February 10, 2016. 
7 http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/cvn/1665/w3-article-351855.html Accessed February 10, 2016. 
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of students was unaffected, and therefore the selectivity of the degrees remained unchanged after 
the reform. This is an ideal environment to test the role of signaling and human capital in college 
education.  
1.4  Effects of the Reform 
 In this section, I estimate the effect of the reduction of the curricula on wages to test the 
prevalence of a pure signaling model versus a model in which human capital matters. I start by 
describing my data, continue with the identification strategy, and end with the results. 
 
1.4.1  Data 
I use administrative data from the Ministry of Education. My main database is the OLE 
(Observatorio Laboral de Educación), which is constructed to follow yearly earnings in the 
formal sector for college graduates in Colombia.8 This information is recorded from Social 
Security payments from 2008 to 2012. The OLE also contains education variables, such as 
university and program attended, graduation year, and personal characteristics.  
SPADIES (Sistema para la Prevención de la Deserción en la Educación Superior) is a 
database that tracks college dropout rates. Like the OLE, it contains data on university attended 
but also has information on the first semester of college, which I needed to identify each student’s 
curriculum. This database also contains household socioeconomic variables. The third database 
contains individual data on Saber 11 scores.  
                                                          
8 75% of workers with a college education are employed in the formal sector (Fedesarrollo, 2013). 
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The three databases contain generated ID numbers to trace individuals9. My baseline 
database contains all students who started college between 2002 and 2007 and graduated after 
2004 from Los Andes and other top-10 schools, and who enrolled in economics or business. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics of some relevant variables in the data. The average individual 
in my sample is 26 years old and has been working for almost three years10. On average, Los 
Andes graduates earn 45% more than graduates of the next 10 schools in the national rankings 
(“Top 10” hereafter) and have higher Saber 11 scores; their parents also have higher incomes.  
1.4.2  Preliminary evidence and empirical strategy 
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of wages for graduates from Los Andes and Top 10 schools 
for economics and business by cohort. Before the reform, the evolution in wages seems fairly 
parallel, and the slopes for wages are statistically the same. There was a constant premium for 
attending Los Andes of 36% for economics and 50% for business. With the curriculum change, 
the premium immediately declined for economics and gradually for business, for a final average 
reduction of 22 percentage points and 12 percentage points, respectively. Figure A3.3 displays 
the wage densities for Los Andes and the Top 10 schools, both before and after the reform. The 
graphs show that for the control group, pre- and post-reform wage densities overlap each other, 
but for Los Andes, post-reform densities shift to the left. Both Figures 4 and A2.3 show that the 
reform had a starkly negative effect on the wage distribution of Los Andes graduates. To estimate 
the magnitude of human capital’s role in wages, I estimate the following DID regression: 
 
                                                          
9 Anonymized identifiers are generated using national identification numbers, name, and date of birth. 
10 The fact that my data consist of wages from individuals at the beginning of their professional careers poses a challenge to my 
specification, since wage profiles are very steep in terms of experience. 
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ln 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1) 
 
where 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the average monthly earnings of student i in year t, (in 2010 pesos). 𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠 is a 
dummy equal to 1 if student 𝑖 went to college at Los Andes, and 0 if he went to another Top 10 
Colombian university (my baseline control group). 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a dummy equal to 1 if a student  
started school after the date of the reform implementation and 0 otherwise, and experience is 
measured in years since graduation. The coefficient 𝛽1 captures the effect of graduating from Los 
Andes after 2006 on wages. I also control for gender, year, and cohort effects in other 
specifications.  
 
1.4.3  Results 
 Tables 3a and 3b show my baseline results: Panel a presents estimates for economics 
and panel b for business. The baseline estimation for equation (1), reported in column 1, indicates 
a decline in wages by 16% for economics and 13% for business. Column 2 adds controls for 
experience squared and gender, and columns 3 through 6 add year and cohort controls to these 
specifications. Throughout all such specifications, there is a negative and strong decline in wages 
as a result of the reform. These results reject a pure signaling model, in which wages should not 
change; given the magnitude of the decline, they demonstrate an important role for human capital 
in the determination of wages.  
While estimation is straightforward in this setting, statistical inference is not.  Moulton 
(1990) shows that the failure to account for the presence of common group errors leads to 
insufficiently conservative inference. In response to this concern, a clustering procedure emerged 
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whereby inference relies on the asymptotic approximations associated with the assumption that 
the number of individuals within a group and/or the number of groups grows large. However, 
this assumption does not apply in my setting. To address this concern, I follow Abadie, Diamond 
and Hainmueller (2010).11 Their inferential exercise examines whether the estimated effect of 
the actual intervention is large relative to the distribution of the effects estimated for schools that 
are not affected by the reform. To implement this procedure, I estimate equation (1) an additional 
10 times, replacing Los Andes with an indicator for one of the other 10 schools. For all cases, the 
estimate for Los Andes was the largest (Table 4). I also evaluate equation (1), changing the date 
of the reform, in addition to the treated school. Figures 5-7 show the distribution of treatment 
effects: In all specifications the effect I estimate is at the 5th percentile mark, or to the left. 
With the data available, I can only estimate the effect of the reform on earnings early in 
students’ careers. However, it is at this stage that the debate over signaling and human capital is 
particularly relevant, given that with time, employers learn about students’ productivity on the 
job (Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Lange (2007)). Specifically, 
consistent with my findings, Lange (2007) finds that employers learn quickly; initial expectation 
errors decline by 50% within 3 years. Lange also estimates that signaling contributes less than 
25% to gains from schooling. 
 It is possible that the reform changed the pool of applicants and entrants in dimensions 
not captured by the Saber 11 that are relevant to the labor market. Specifically, given the decline 
in requirements to graduate, lower-ability individuals should be motivated to enroll in these 
programs—thereby decreasing the value of the signal and, in turn, wages. To address this, I 
                                                          
11 See also Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Cunningham and Shah (2017) for recent applications of this method. 
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estimate an alternative specification in which the treatment group consists solely of Los Andes 
students who were already enrolled at the time of the reform, but studied under the new curricula. 
Table 5 and Figure 6 show results for this alternative treatment group. According to the data, 
there is a strong and negative effect on wages of around 16% for economics and 12% for business.  
Given that the number of years of wage observations by group is unbalanced (pre-reform 
vs. post-reform and treated vs. untreated), in Table 6 and Figure 7 I include observations with 
at most three years of experience, to ensure that the treatment coefficient is not capturing 
differences in the slope of the experience profile. Results in Table 6 again suggest strong wage 
declines of the same magnitudes as those found previously.   
To make use of all data available, and recognizing the potential for heterogeneous effects, 
I now turn to a changes-in-changes (CIC) estimation following Athey and Imbens (2006) and 
Melly and Santangelo (2015) that extends the model to include covariates. I estimate CIC for the 
10th through 90th percentiles after controlling for experience, gender, and cohort effects. As can 
be seen in Figure 8, there is little evidence of heterogeneity in the reform’s effect on wages by 
percentiles and fields, suggesting that the assumptions of the traditional DID estimator hold. 
The decline in wages I find is large, and suggests sizable estimates of the return to 
attending college at Los Andes. To better understand the magnitude of my estimates, I perform 
a back of the envelope calculation that attempts to quantify the reduction in the wage premium 
of attending college at Los Andes. Using a cross-section estimate of the return to college and an 
estimate of the return to Los Andes from Saavedra (2008), I find that the return to attending 
college at Los Andes relative to not attending college is 110% (details of this calculation are 
explained in Appendix 2). This implies that the reform reduced the premium by 14.5% and 11.8% 
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as a result of a reduction in credits of 20% and 14% in economics and business, respectively. 
However, in the absence of a causal estimate of the return to college for this setup, I cannot 
decompose this return.  
1.5 Mechanism 
 When and how do employers find out about these graduates’ lower human capital? 
Specifically, were they able to detect it in the recruitment process, during tests or interviews? Or 
did they notice it on the job? Unfortunately, I do not have the information necessary to fully 
answer these questions, but I do have data collected by the economics department at Los Andes, 
on the employers of all economics graduates by cohort, which I use to investigate whether 
employers changed with the reform. Table A3.3 lists the main employers before and after the 
reform, and shows that there are important differences. There seems to be a connection between 
the change in curriculum and the change in employers: The Central Bank, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the National Planning Department are less likely to employ economists who 
graduated under the new curriculum, under which the courses Monetary Policy, Public Finance, 
and Colombian Economic Policy were no longer mandatory. Indeed, Figure A3.6 shows that 
there was a decline in the number of students enrolled in these classes after the reform. From this 
comparison, I also find that the likelihood of being employed by the highest paying firms 
decreased with the reform. Using a ranking of the 100 highest paying firms for recent graduates 
in economics, I find that the share of students in these firms fell from 24% to 14% after the 
reform.   
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I interviewed employers to learn about their experiences with hiring economics graduates, and 
as anecdotal evidence I learned that:12 (i) most knew about the reform from talking to recent 
graduates; (ii) they believe they can detect changes in human capital through tests they 
administered in the recruitment process; (iii) they argue that for some jobs, the content made 
optional in the new curriculum is critical; (iv) they believe that taking fewer elective courses 
affects graduates’ labor prospects beyond the recruitment process, because the professors in those 
courses are helpful with job offers and job referrals; and (v) wages for new graduates are fixed. 
All of the above provides suggestive evidence that under the new curricula, the pool of jobs a 
graduate can obtain is smaller, either because they cannot succeed in the recruitment process—
which includes tests on content they did not cover in school—or because they have less contact 
with professors who have connections in the job market. It is clear that the first reason is entirely 
due to a decrease in human capital, but this is not the case with the second. 
 To evaluate whether the reform had an impact on students’ ability to obtain jobs, I 
perform a DID exercise with data from the recruitment process for recently graduated economists 
at the Central Bank of Colombia. This consists of a written exam, which tests specific knowledge 
necessary for the position, as well as human resources tests and interviews with both human 
resources staff and department heads. Most such openings are publicly announced through 
employment websites and social networks, and are open to any and all applicants. I have data on 
university and enrollment terms for all candidates for economist positions from 2008 to 2014, 
along with the final hiring decision. For candidates who studied under the old curriculum, the 
probability of being hired was 27%; this fell to 6% with the reform. Table 7 shows the results of 
                                                          
12 I conducted interviews with 11 out of the 14 employers listed on the left panel of Table A2.3. 
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the DID exercise. According to data, after the reform there is a reduction of 16.7 percentage 
points in the probability of being hired by the Central Bank for students from Los Andes versus 
students from Top 10 schools. This suggests that one of the possible mechanisms that led to the 
decline in wages is a decline in the performance of students during the recruitment process. As a 
result, the pool of offers a student could choose from was smaller, and students started in lower-
paying jobs. 
The previous mechanism points to an environment in which employer learning happens 
rapidly due to the availability of tests on specific content used in the recruitment process. Thus, 
one would expect that employers notice the reduction in instruction at Los Andes soon after the 
first students enter the job market, which is what happened in economics (Figure 4). For 
business, however, if the recruitment process relies less on testing specific knowledge, we would 
not expect to see this pattern. Interviews with recruitment agencies suggest that this is the case, 
since a large share of the openings for recent graduates in business are also available to graduates 
from economics and engineering, and thus tests on content are less appropriate. As a 
consequence, the qualitative evidence suggests that it might take longer for employers of business 
students to notice the differences in human capital of the new cohorts. 
 
1.6  Robustness Checks 
 In this section I perform several robustness checks to address possible confounding 
factors in my estimation. I then discuss some important caveats and limitations.  
 It is possible that my estimates capture a negative trend in the return to a degree from Los 
Andes. To determine whether this is the case, I replicate my baseline estimation using a placebo 
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date for the reform. Specifically, I include only cohorts that studied under the old curricula, and 
set a fake reform date in the middle of the period covered. If my results were driven by a decline 
in the return to Los Andes, any post*Andes interaction would be negative and statistically 
significant. However, as shown in Table 8, all of the estimated effects are statistically equal to 
zero and smaller than 0.7% in economics, and positive for business. 
An alternative placebo check to address this concern is to test what happens to law 
graduates (a major whose curriculum was not reformed) during the dates of the reform in 
economics and business. Results in Table 9 show that there is no effect on wages for Los Andes 
law graduates on the date of the reform in economics or business. All of the above suggest that 
the strong decline in wages I find is not the result of other trends or changes at Los Andes. 
Table 10 presents a series of additional robustness checks. The first two columns show 
results for economics and the last two for business; columns 1 and 3 estimate equation 1 with 
cohort controls, and columns 2 and 4 add experience squared and gender. A possible explanation 
for these results is that there is an age penalty in the labor market. We can imagine that if two 
graduates have the same credentials, employers might lean toward the older one, thinking that 
life experience is valuable for the job. In this case, having cohorts that graduate half a year 
younger would result in lower wages, regardless of human capital or signaling considerations. 
To check this possibility, I include age as an independent variable in my baseline estimation. The 
results in panel a of Table 10 suggest that there is a strong effect of the reform outside of age 
considerations. For economics, the effect is the same (-16%), and for business it is smaller (-9%). 
 One might also be worried about the fact that the reform generated two cohorts that 
graduated at the same time, which might have distorted wages by creating more competition. In 
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panel b of Table 10, I exclude these two cohorts and perform my baseline estimation; results 
show that the effects hold, even with the exclusion.  
 An additional concern about the previous estimates is the validity of the control group. 
Even though the pre-trends in wages were similar, the control group might not be a good 
counterfactual—if, for example, the two groups face different labor markets, and these evolved 
in different ways after the reform. To address this, I limit my control group to students graduating 
from the next three highest ranked schools, because it is likely that students from these 
institutions will face the same labor market as students from Los Andes. Panel c of Table 10 
presents the results of the reform’s effect on wages under this alternative control group; we can 
see that there is a negative effect of the reform on wages of similar magnitude to the one found 
before.  
An alternative way to address the concern about the validity of the control group is to 
include only students who had the academic credentials required to attend Los Andes in the 
control group. Specifically, I include students who attended Top 10 schools and had Saber 11 
scores greater than the minimum per cohort observed at Los Andes for economics and business. 
Panel d of Table 10 shows the results of this alternative exercise: Wages fall by a magnitude 
larger than in the baseline estimation (18% for economics and 15% for business). 
Panel e of Table 10 repeats the baseline estimation, excluding cohort 2007-1; as shown 
in Figure 4, this cohort had particularly low wages for students from Los Andes. Again, the 
results are very similar, suggesting strong declines in wages. Finally, Panel f includes Saber 11 
scores as a covariate. We can see that when controlling for test scores, the results hold and even 
increase slightly.  
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 Since there are multiple possible choices for control groups, I follow Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and perform a synthetic control exercise in which I look for the best 
combination of major and school to match the pre-trend data of my treated groups. The 
comparison unit in the synthetic control method is selected as the weighted average of all 
potential comparison units that best resembles the characteristics of the case of interest. Table 
11 shows the results of my baseline specification with respect to the optimally chosen control 
group. This group features engineering, business, and law graduates of Top 10 schools. Using 
this method, results are similar to the ones found previously: The reform’s effect for economics 
graduates ranges from -7% to -13%, and for business graduates there is a larger dispersion, with 
the effect ranging from -5% to -20%. 
 Finally, in the previous analysis I assumed that the reform did not have an effect on labor 
force participation. To check that this is the case, I estimate the effect of the reform on the 
probability of being employed in the formal sector. Table A3.3 shows the results of a DID 
regression on the probability of being employed. For both economics and business the effects is 
very close to zero and statistically insignificant.13 In addition, since one of the motives for the 
reform was to increase graduate school enrollment, it is important to check for changes along this 
dimension. It is possible, for instance, that before the reform only students in the right tail of the 
ability distribution attended graduate school, but after the reform more students enrolled, and 
therefore the estimated difference in wages results from comparing wages from different 
segments of the ability distribution. To determine whether this is the case, I use LinkedIn and 
personal and firm websites to obtain information on graduate school enrollment for the last three 
                                                          
13 Saavedra (2008) finds a positive effect of attending Los Andes on employment (p. 22, table 8). The first 
difference of the regression on Table A3.3 supports this finding. 
24 
 
cohorts that studied under the old curriculum and the first three that studied under the new one. 
Figure A3.4 shows that the percentage of graduates found on LinkedIn—around 60%—is similar 
to the rates before and after the reform. Figure A3.5 also shows the share of graduates by cohort 
who enrolled in graduate school in the first four years after obtaining an undergraduate degree, 
and the shares do not seem to increase with the reform. All of the above suggests that selection 
does not appear to be driving the decline in wages. 
 
1.7 Conclusions 
In this paper I identify the effect of human capital on wages by exploiting a curriculum 
change at Universidad de los Andes in Colombia. In 2006, the amount of coursework required to 
earn a college degree in economics and business decreased by 20% and 14%, respectively. This 
was accomplished by dropping 12 courses in economics and 6 in business, and a reduction in 
instruction time of one semester. The reform did not alter the quality of the entering or graduating 
classes or the school ranking. Because wages should fall under the human capital model—but 
remain constant under pure signaling—this constitutes an ideal natural experiment for learning 
about signaling vs. human capital.  
Using administrative data on wages and college attendance from 2008 to 2012, I find that 
wages fell by 16% in economics and 13% in business. Given the size and statistical significance 
of the decline in wages, my estimates suggest that human capital plays an important role in the 
determination of wages. The results also reject a model in which signaling is the only function 
of college education. Note that this result does not rule out completely a role for signaling. For 
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example, also using data on Colombia, Macleod et al. (2017) find evidence of a signaling role in 
college reputation. 
I use data and interviews from employers of economics graduates to study the 
mechanisms that led to the decline in wages. I find that the distribution of employers changed 
with the reform, and that the likelihood of being employed by the highest paying firms decreased. 
Employers argue that some of the content that was made optional in the new curricula was 
essential to the positions they offered; if that was the case, employers would have noticed that 
students had less human capital through knowledge tests in the recruitment process. This suggests 
that under the new curricula, the pool of jobs a graduate can obtain is smaller because they 
perform worse during the recruitment process, which subsequently decreases their wages. Using 
recruitment data from the Central Bank, I find support for this hypothesis and estimate that the 
reform reduced the probability of being successful by 17 percentage points. 
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1.9 List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Effect of the reform in degree duration 
 
Source: Annual statistical bulletin – Universidad de los Andes. Scatter plots are mean degree duration per cohort. 
A cohort is defined by the semester the student started school. This graph includes all students who started the 
program. Solid lines are the fitted values of a linear regression on time, and dashed lines represent 95% CI of the 
estimation. The vertical line represents the time of the reform. 
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Figure 2: Effect of the reform in credits studied 
 
Source: Department of Economics – Universidad de los Andes. Scatter plots are credits studied by cohort. Solid 
lines are the fitted values of a linear regression on time and dashed lines are the 95% CI of the estimation. The 
vertical line represents the time of the reform. 
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Figure 4: Pre trends and the effect of the reform on wages 
  
 
Source: Ministry of Education. Scatter plots are mean wages per cohort and school group. Lines are the fitted 
values of a regression quadratic on time. The vertical line represents the time of the reform. 
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Figure 5: Treatment effect distribution (Table 3a and 3b) 
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Figure 6: Treatment effect distribution (Table 5) 
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Figure 7: Treatment effect distribution (Table 6) 
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Figure 8: Changes in changes estimates 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Education. CIC estimates of an estimation that controls for experience, gender, and cohort 
variables. Confidence intervals at the 95th percent level.  
Test—Economics: Constant effect: QTE(x)=QTE(0.5) for all x; KS-statistic: 0.61; CMS-statistic: 0.47. Test—
Business: Constant effect: QTE(x)=QTE(0.5) for all x; KS-statistic: 0.374; CMS-statistic: 0.276.  
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1.10 List of Tables  
 
Table 1: First stage –The effect of the reform on instruction and class quality 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
  
Dep variable: No. of credits
Econ Buss Econ Econ Buss Econ Buss Econ Buss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post -1.038** -0.916*** -24.37** 8.56 -22.15 -1.396 36.42 0.0192 0.00097
-0.367 -0.262 -6.751 -14.74 -32.2 -40.97 -71.51 -0.0635 -0.0496
Trend pre 0.0943 -0.0821 3.317* 1.024 2.086 -6.272 -1.655 -0.0135 -0.00503
-0.119 -0.0528 -1.637 -2.248 -4.124 -5.546 -7.913 -0.011 -0.00606
Trend post -0.121*** -0.0309 -0.545 0.0952 -2.309 12.90*** 19.93*** 0.00692 0.0145** 
-0.028 -0.0266 -1.637 -2.248 -1.899 -3.755 -3.801 -0.00596 -0.00606
Constant 9.716*** 10.51*** 160.8*** 68.08*** 64.35*** 637.6*** 557.0*** 0.842*** 0.789***
-0.222 -0.181 -5.43 -9.403 -5.537 -21.28 -16.13 -0.0438 -0.0376
Obs 18 18 10 16 16 21 21 20 20
R squared 0.868 0.881 0.867 0.233 0.171 0.45 0.672 0.163 0.427
Source: Annual bullletin -Universidad de los Andes & Department of economics.
Degree duration Class size HS test scores Graduation rates
Andes Economics 3,017,001 2.6 25.8 0.46 58.1 5.93 1,736
1,776,674 1.9 2.2 0.50 5.5 1.44
Top 10 2,119,275 2.98 26.26 0.59 51.28 3.75 3,580
1,457,070 1.98 2.83 0.49 6.01 1.76
Andes Business 3,192,033 2.5 25.8 0.46 58.1 5.93 2,659
1,959,143 1.8 2.2 0.50 5.5 1.44
Top 10 2,141,599 2.90 26.24 0.59 51.33 3.82 22,505
1,522,623 2.01 2.79 0.49 6.03 1.76
2,482,154 2.66 25.8 0.55 57.6 5.87 6,069
1,695,091 1.99 2.2 0.50 5.4 1.53
Note: Top rows show means and  bottom standard deviation. * Based on a clasification over 9 categories of income. Data 
from all students who started college between 2002 and 2007, and graduated after 2004. The top 10 universities were 
chosen using SABER PRO scores for schools of at least 1,000 students. Source: Ministry of Education, Colombia. 
Obs
Other majors at Los 
Andes
Real wage Experience Age Female HS test Family income*
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Table 3a: Baseline results. Effect of the reform on wages. 
 
 
 
 
Economics
Dep var: Ln wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post*Andes -0.163** -0.161** -0.167*** -0.164** -0.164** -0.161** 
[0.0500] [0.0501] [0.0505] [0.0505] [0.0501] [0.0501]   
Post 0.0817** 0.0819** 0.0721* 0.0744* 0.0810* 0.0865*  
[0.0293] [0.0292] [0.0311] [0.0310] [0.0366] [0.0360]   
Andes 0.312*** 0.301*** 0.312*** 0.300*** 0.311*** 0.300***
[0.0304] [0.0301] [0.0304] [0.0301] [0.0304] [0.0301]   
Experience 0.135*** 0.154*** 0.137*** 0.154*** 0.135*** 0.156***
[0.00842] [0.0173] [0.00841] [0.0173] [0.0127] [0.0188]   
Experience sq -0.00424 -0.004 -0.00429
[0.00431] [0.00429] [0.00431]   
Female -0.0912*** -0.0908*** -0.0914***
[0.0223] [0.0223] [0.0224]   
Constant 14.16*** 14.20*** 14.13*** 14.17*** 13.96*** 14.19***
[0.0197] [0.0238] [0.0495] [0.0511] [0.0846] [0.0383]   
Cohort control N N Y Y N N
Year D N N N N Y Y
Clusters 11 11 11 11 11 11
Obs 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621
R-sq 0.157 0.165 0.157 0.165 0.159 0.167
Standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Control group: students from economics at top 10 schools.
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Source: Ministry of Education OLE and SPADIES.
Cohort control: Semiannual GDP growth. Cohort refer to the semester and year the 
students started school. Year refers to the year of the wage observation.
Ln wage is the natural logarithm of the average monthly wage. Post is a dummy 
equal to one after the reform, Andes is a dummy equal to one if the student went to 
Los Andes. Experience is measured in years.
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Table 3b: Baseline results. Effect of the reform on wages. 
 
 
 
 
Business
Dep var: Ln wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post*Andes -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.135** -0.136** 
[0.0410] [0.0413] [0.0412] [0.0414] [0.0412] [0.0414]   
Post 0.0952*** 0.0940*** 0.0555** 0.0558** 0.0971*** 0.0991***
[0.0153] [0.0152] [0.0185] [0.0185] [0.0189] [0.0188]   
Andes 0.429*** 0.423*** 0.432*** 0.427*** 0.429*** 0.423***
[0.0312] [0.0316] [0.0312] [0.0316] [0.0312] [0.0315]   
Experience 0.124*** 0.145*** 0.128*** 0.147*** 0.125*** 0.151***
[0.00517] [0.0115] [0.00512] [0.0115] [0.00782] [0.0120]   
Experience sq -0.00525 -0.00481 -0.00635*  
[0.00303] [0.00303] [0.00302]   
Female -0.0976*** -0.0969*** -0.0979***
[0.0147] [0.0147] [0.0148]   
Constant 14.06*** 14.11*** 13.96*** 14.00*** 14.15*** 14.10***
[0.0129] [0.0160] [0.0317] [0.0337] [0.0968] [0.0243]   
Cohort control N N Y Y N N
Year D N N N N Y Y
Clusters 11 11 11 11 11 11
N 10,348 10,348 10,348 10,348 10,348 10,348
R-sq 0.122 0.130 0.124 0.132 0.122 0.131
Standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Control group: students from business at top 10 schools.
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Source: Ministry of Education OLE and SPADIES.
Cohort control: Semiannual GDP growth. Cohort refer to the semester and year the 
students started school. Year refers to the year of the wage observation.
Ln wage is the natural logarithm of the average monthly wage. Post is a dummy 
equal to one after the reform, Andes is a dummy equal to one if the student went to 
Los Andes. Experience is measured in years.
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Table 4a: Placebo coefficients 
 
Table 4a: Placebo coefficients 
 
Business
Diff in Diff coeficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Andes -0.136 -0.136 -0.141 -0.141 -0.135 -0.136
Placebo school 1 -0.085 -0.083 -0.088 -0.087 -0.084 -0.082
Placebo school 2 -0.059 -0.055 -0.052 -0.049 -0.058 -0.054
Placebo school 3 -0.045 -0.045 -0.044 -0.043 -0.046 -0.045
Placebo school 4 -0.040 -0.033 -0.038 -0.035 -0.039 -0.032
Placebo school 5 -0.032 -0.033 -0.034 -0.032 -0.029 -0.032
Placebo school 6 -0.025 -0.017 -0.033 -0.024 -0.020 -0.011
Placebo school 7 -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.008 -0.010 -0.001
Placebo school 8 0.017 0.006 0.025 0.014 0.025 0.015
Placebo school 9 0.072 0.075 0.077 0.079 0.074 0.077
Placebo school 10 0.104 0.100 0.113 0.108 0.107 0.103
Cohort control N N Y Y N N
Year D N N N N Y Y
Clusters 11 11 11 11 11 11
Obs 10,352 10,352 10,352 10,352 10,352 10,352
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
Source: Ministry of Education OLE and SPADIES.
Cohort control: Semiannual GDP growth. Cohort refer to the semester and year the 
Ln wage is the natural logarithm of the average monthly wage. Post is a dummy equal to 
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Table 5: Effect of the reform on wages. Alternative treatment group: students already in school 
by the time of the reform. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Economics
Dep var: Ln wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post*Andes -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.165*** -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.159***
[0.0534] [0.0536] [0.0538] [0.0540] [0.0537] [0.0539]   
Post 0.0737** 0.0726** 0.0669** 0.0681** 0.0713** 0.0768** 
[0.0288] [0.0289] [0.0308] [0.0309] [0.0344] [0.0343]   
Andes 0.312*** 0.300*** 0.312*** 0.300*** 0.311*** 0.298***
[0.0304] [0.0301] [0.0304] [0.0301] [0.0304] [0.0301]   
Obs 3,485 3,485 3,485 3,485 3,485 3,485
Panel B: Business
Post*Andes -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.117*** -0.118***
[0.0420] [0.0422] [0.0172] [0.0423] [0.0421] [0.0424]   
Post 0.0925*** 0.0913*** 0.0525** 0.0527*** 0.0933*** 0.0955***
[0.0157] [0.0156] [0.0191] [0.0185] [0.0191] [0.0190]   
Andes 0.429*** 0.424*** 0.433*** 0.427*** 0.430*** 0.424***
[0.0312] [0.0315] [0.0811] [0.0316] [0.0312] [0.0315]   
Obs. 9,979 9,979 9,979 9,979 9,979 9,979
Standard errors clustered at the student level.
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Source: Ministry of Education.
(1) experience. (2) experience, experience squared and gender. (3) experience and 
cohort controls. (4) experience, experience squared, gender and cohort controls. (5) 
experience and year dummies. (6) experience, experience squared, gender and year 
dummies.Cohort control: Semiannual GDP growth. Cohort refer to the semester and year the 
students started school. Year refers to the year of the wage observation.
Ln wage is the natural logarithm of the average monthly wage. Post is a dummy equal to 
one if a person studied with the new curricul but was enrrolled beofre the change, 
Andes is a dummy equal to one if the student went to Los Andes. Experience is 
measured in years.
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Table 6: Cap at three years of experience 
 
  
 
Panel A: Economics
Dep var: Ln wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post*Andes -0.166*** -0.164*** -0.170*** -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.164***
[0.0484] [0.0486] [0.0487] [0.0488] [0.0485] [0.0487]   
Post 0.0846*** 0.0835*** 0.0751** 0.0752** 0.0829** 0.0858** 
[0.0281] [0.0281] [0.0304] [0.0304] [0.0343] [0.0343]   
Andes 0.314*** 0.305*** 0.313*** 0.304*** 0.313*** 0.304***
[0.0283] [0.0282] [0.0283] [0.0282] [0.0283] [0.0282]   
Obs 3,314 3,314 3,314 3,314 3,314 3,314
Panel B: Business
Post*Andes -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.134*** -0.132*** -0.129*** -0.128***
[0.0402] [0.0403] [0.0403] [0.0404] [0.0403] [0.0404]   
Post 0.0953*** 0.0951*** 0.0600*** 0.0609*** 0.101*** 0.104***
[0.0152] [0.0151] [0.0184] [0.0183] [0.0187] [0.0187]   
Andes 0.422*** 0.415*** 0.425*** 0.419*** 0.421*** 0.415***
[0.0300] [0.0302] [0.0300] [0.0302] [0.0300] [0.0303]   
Obs 9,627 9,627 9,627 9,627 9,627 9,627
Standard errors clustered at the student level.
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Source: Ministry of Education.
(1) experience. (2) experience, experience squared and gender. (3) experience and cohort 
controls. (4) experience, experience squared, gender and cohort controls. (5) experience 
and year dummies. (6) experience, experience squared, gender and year dummies.
Cohort control: Semiannual GDP growth. Cohort refer to the semester and year the 
students started school. Year refers to the year of the wage observation.
Ln wage is the natural logarithm of the average monthly wage. Post is a dummy equal to 
one if a person studied with the new curricul but was enrrolled beofre the change, Andes 
is a dummy equal to one if the student went to Los Andes. Experience is measured in 
years.
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Table 7: Effect of the reform on the recruitment process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 1 if hired and 0 if not
Andes*Post -0.167**
0.073
Post -0.049
0.031
Andes 0.163***
0.058
Constant 0.112***
0.023
Obs 438
R squared 0.03
Standard errors below the coefficients
Source: Central Bank of Colombia.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Data from the recruitment process for economist positions from 
2008 to 2014
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Table 8: Placebo test 1—Alternative date of the reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Economics
Dep var: Ln wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fake post*Andes -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003
[0.0481] [0.0482] [0.0488] [0.0490] [0.0482] [0.0486]   
Fake post 0.012 0.002 -0.017 -0.025 0.018 0.015
[0.0458] [0.0455] [0.0605] [0.0592] [0.0498] [0.0497]   
Andes 0.313*** 0.300*** 0.315*** 0.301*** 0.309*** 0.294***
[0.0357] [0.0366] [0.0366] [0.0375] [0.0365] [0.0375]   
Panel B: Business
Fake post*Andes 0.016 0.009 0.017 0.009 0.014 0.006
[0.0838] [0.0785] [0.0915] [0.0847] [0.0812] [0.0758]   
Fake post 0.061 0.061 -0.057 -0.054 0.080 0.082
[0.0772] [0.0747] [0.184] [0.177] [0.0821] [0.0782]   
Andes 0.420*** 0.417*** 0.423*** 0.420*** 0.420*** 0.416***
[0.0640] [0.0593] [0.0681] [0.0618] [0.0612] [0.0567]   
Standard errors clustered at thestudent level.
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Source: Ministry of Education.
(1) experience. (2) experience, experience squared and gender. (3) experience and cohort 
controls. (4) experience, experience squared, gender and cohort controls. (5) experience and 
year dummies. (6) experience, experience squared, gender and year dummies.
I take only the students that studied under the old curriculum and set the reform date on the 
midle of the period (2004-1 for econ and 2003-2 for business). 
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Table 9: Placebo test 2—Reform evaluated using data from law graduates 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dep var: Ln wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Date of economics reform
Post*Andes -0.00952 -0.00913 -0.00696 -0.00657 -0.00282 -0.00261
[0.0525] [0.0524] [0.0535] [0.0536] [0.0572] [0.0573]   
Date of business reform
Post*Andes -0.0238 -0.023 -0.0224 -0.0216 -0.0103 -0.00964
[0.0341] [0.0342] [0.0347] [0.0348] [0.0379] [0.0380]   
Obs 3,388 3,388 3,388 3,388 3,388 3,388
R-sq 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
St errors clustered at the student level.
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Source: Ministry of Education.
(1) experience. (2) experience, experience squared and gender. (3) experience and 
cohort controls. (4) experience, experience squared, gender and cohort controls. (5) 
experience and year dummies. (6) experience, experience squared, gender and year 
dummies.
Cohort control: Semiannual GDP growth. Cohort refer to the semester and year the 
students started school. Year refers to the year of the wage observation.
Ln wage is the natural logarithm of the average monthly wage. Post is a dummy equal 
to one if a person studied with the new curricul but was enrrolled beofre the change, 
Andes is a dummy equal to one if the student went to Los Andes. Experience is 
measured in years.
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Table 10: Robustness checks 
 
 
 
Economics Economics Business Business
Dep variable: Ln wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel a: Controlling for age
Treatment -0.162*** -0.158*** -0.0952** -0.0950**
[0.0510] [0.0510] [0.0410] [0.0412]
Panel b: Without cohorts that graduated at the same time
Treatment -0.159*** -0.154*** -0.118*** -0.118***
[0.0552] [0.0552] [0.0437] [0.0439]
Panel c: Taking graduates from Top 3 schools as control (1)
Treatment -0.115** -0.115** -0.145*** -0.145***
[0.0557] [0.0557] [0.0472] [0.0472]   
Treatment -0.186*** -0.184*** -0.152** -0.151**
[0.0434] [0.0441] [0.0640] [0.0626]
Panel e: Without 2007-1 cohort
Treatment -0.152*** -0.146*** -0.117*** -0.118***
[0.0510] [0.0511] [0.0418] [0.0420]
Panel f: Controlling for HS exit scores
Treatment -0.185*** -0.180*** -0.161* -0.160**
[0.0469] [0.0472] [0.0624] [0.0611]
Experience Y Y Y Y
Experience squared N Y N Y
Gender N Y N Y
Cohort effects Y Y Y Y
Standard errors clustered by individual.
(1) Top 3 schools are Nacional, Javeriana and Rosario.
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Source: Ministry of Education.
Panel d: Including in the control group only students that could have 
attended Los Andes
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Table 11: Synthetic control 
 
 
 
Dep variable: Ln wage (1) (2)
Treatment -0.133** -0.134**
[0.0632] [0.0635]   
Treatment -0.0719 -0.07
[0.0695] [0.0695]   
Treatment -0.11 -0.111
[0.0786] [0.0791]   
Treatment -0.134** -0.133**
[0.0615] [0.0614]   
Panel b: Business 
Treatment -0.197*** -0.201***
[0.0539] [0.0539]   
Treatment -0.101* -0.101*
[0.0578] [0.0578]   
Treatment -0.0971* -0.0961*
[0.0551] [0.0549]   
Treatment -0.0508 -0.0506
[0.0579] [0.0577]
Standard errors clustered by individual. 
Standard erros in brackets below the coefficients.
The number in parenthesis is the optimal weight.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: Ministry of Education.
Column 1 includes experience and cohort controls, column 2  adds experience square and 
gender.
Control: Oil Engineering-Nacional (46%)
Control: Business - EAFIT  (38.3%)
Panel a: Economics 
Control: Industrial Engineering - Javeriana  (70.8%)
Control: Industrial Engineering-Nacional (16.3%)
Control: Industrial Engineering- U Norte (6%)
Control: Oil Engineering-Nacional (7%)
Control: Industrial Engineering - Javeriana (14%)
Control: Law - Andes (1%)
Chapter 2
The Cost of Bad Parents:
Evidence from the Effects of Parental
Incarceration on Children’s Education
Abstract
This paper provides evidence that parental incarceration increases children’s educational
attainment. I collect criminal records for 90,000 low-income parents who have been convicted
of a crime in Colombia, and combine it with administrative data on the educational attainment
of their children. I exploit exogenous variation in parental incarceration resulting from the
random assignment of defendants to judges with different propensities to convict and incar-
cerate. My identification strategy differs from the usual judge IV application because I model
incarceration as two stage decision problem: First conviction, and then incarceration. I exploit
judge leniency along these two different margins. Intuitively, I take advantage of the fact that I
can compare children of parents who faced similar judge conviction leniency, but had different
incarceration leniency. I derive a new expression that extends the Local Average Treatment
Effect concept to a setting with two sources of unobserved treatment heterogeneity. I find that
conditional on conviction, parental incarceration increases education by 0.7 years for children
whose parents are on the margin of incarceration. This positive effect is larger for boys, violent
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crimes, and cases in which the incarcerated parent is the mother.
2.1 Introduction
Over one million children in EU countries, and 2.7 million children in the U.S., have a parent
in prison (Sykes and Pettit, 2014).1 Family environments during the early years, and especially
parenting, are major determinants of human development (Heckman, 2013 and Almond et al.,
2019), yet there is only a small literature investigating the effects of parental incarceration on
children’s outcomes. A large body of correlation-based evidence finds negative associations be-
tween parental incarceration and a host of important variables such as mental health, education,
and crime (Wakefield, 2015). However, households with incarcerated parents are disadvantaged
along many dimensions.2 Therefore, differences across outcomes means would lead to negatively
biased estimates.
In this paper, I estimate the causal effects of parental incarceration on children’s educational
attainment in Colombia. I exploit exogenous variation in parental incarceration resulting from the
random assignment of defendants to judges with different propensities to convict and incarcerate
defendants. I construct a new dataset that links sociodemographic data on households with children
from SISBEN, Colombia’s census of the low-income population, to criminal records for parents
scraped from the internet. I find criminal records for approximately 90,000 parents for the years
2005 to 2016. Then, I link the educational outcomes of criminals’ children using administrative
data on public school enrollment. Finally I web-scrape the children’s criminal records after they
turn eighteen years old.
I estimate that on average, conditional on conviction, parental incarceration increases education
1Sykes and Pettit (2014) also estimate that for the U.S., 62% of black children born to high school dropouts will
experience the imprisonment of a parent by age 17.
2Even prior to the incarceration event, these households are more likely to be poor and to experience domestic
violence (Arditti, 2005; Arditti et al., 2012). In the US, Mumola (2000) finds that 60% of parents in prison reported
that they used drugs in the month before their offense, 25% reported a history of alcohol dependence, and about
14% reported a mental illness. Western (2018) also documents that around 60% of parents in prison had experienced
childhood trauma, such as domestic violence and sexual abuse.
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by 0.7 years for children whose parents were on the margin of going to prison. With an average
schooling of 6.8 years, this corresponds to an increase of 10.2%. Under strong monotonicity
assumptions, the marginal treatment effect estimates suggests that the benefit of parental incarcer-
ation is larger for children of parents who were incarcerated by more lenient judges. Intuitively, on
average those who are incarcerated by lenient judges have worse unobserved characteristics, than
those incarcerated by the most strict judges. In terms of observed heterogeneity, point estimates
suggest that the benefit of parental incarceration is larger when the child is a boy, incarceration
was for a violent crime, or the incarcerated parent is the mother, though only the difference in the
treatment effects by gender of the child is statistically significant. I also find a U−shaped pattern
in the age of the child at the time of the parent’s incarceration. Larger positive effects are estimated
between ages 0 to 5 and 10 to 15, compared to 5 to 10.
My findings suggest that, on average, parents who are on the margin of incarceration in Colom-
bia are likely to reduce their child’s educational attainment if they remain in the household. Re-
search shows that removing a violent parent or negative role model from the household can create
a safer environment for a child (Jaffee et al., 2003; Johnson, 2009). Criminal parents may also
deplete economic resources in the household. The economic contribution of defendants is likely
to be small; Mueller-Smith (2015) finds that in the US, only one-third to two-fifths of incarcerated
parents were employed before being charged. Parental incarceration may also reduce the inter-
generational transmission of violence, substance abuse, and crime.3 Lastly, parental incarceration
may result in the child being placed with an alternative caregiver who has better resources to care
for the child. Indeed, I find suggestive evidence which indicates that after an episode of parental
incarceration, children often move in with their grandparents. Children are also more likely to
move to a household not in SISBEN, which suggests an improvement in economic conditions.
Previous papers in this literature use the random assignment of defendants to judges and their
systematic differences in leniency to estimate the causal effects of incarceration on various out-
3For example, using data from Sweden, Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2007) report significant father-son correlations
in criminal activity that begin to appear between the ages 7 and 12, and are fully established by the son’s teen years.
This result also relates to findings in other fields that conclude that the positive effects of being raised by one’s parents
depend on the quality of care that the parents can provide (Jaffee et al., 2003).
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comes.4 These papers omit the fact that there are two distinct margins on which judges are mark-
ing decisions. Specifically, judges decide first on conviction, and then, for those convicted, they
decide on incarceration. When omitting this distinction, researchers compare incarcerated defen-
dants with those who were not convicted and those who were convicted but not incarcerated. These
two distinct groups may have different treatment effects that are of interest to policy makers, and
respond to different policy concerns. The conviction margin is related to the question of who is,
or, who should be convicted of crime; whereas the incarceration margin is related to the question:
What is or what should be the punishment for those who are convicted. In my setting this distinc-
tion is particularly important because I only observe defendants who are convicted. I show that
under treatment effect heterogeneity, the resulting sample selection in the incarceration stage im-
plies that the estimated treatment effect of incarceration does not have the standard local average
treatment effect (LATE) interpretation. I derive an easily interpretable expression of the resulting
experimental estimates that extends the LATE concept to a setting with two sources of treatment
heterogeneity.
I model this situation in a general framework in which treatment can take three values, and is
decided upon crossing two thresholds along distinct unobserved margins of selection. In my case,
crossing the first threshold decides conviction, and for those convicted, crossing the second thresh-
old determines incarceration. The three treatment outcomes are i) not convicted, ii) convicted and
not incarcerated, and iii) convicted and incarcerated. I use the technology to identify treatment
effects in a setting with multiple threshold-crossing rules of Lee and Salanie (2018).5 Given an
instrument for each of the two decision margins, treatment effects related to the second margin
(incarceration) can be identified by fixing the crossing of the first threshold, and then exploiting
further instrumental variation on the second margin. In the presence of treatment effect hetero-
4For previous papers in the incarceration literature see Kling (2006); Aizer and Doyle (2015); Di Tella and Schar-
grodsky (2013); Mueller-Smith (2015); Bhuller et al. (2016); and Dobbie et al. (2018a), among others. Bhuller et al.
(2016) explicitly discusses the multiple dimensions of sentencing decisions when analyzing possible violation of the
exclusion restriction, this is however, a distinct concern. The concern here is that the control group of these studies is
has a combination of treatment assignment: Not convicted and convicted but not incarcerated, separating this control
group may provide important policy results.
5Classical approaches to address sample selection omit discussion of treatment effect heterogeneity (Heckman
(1978) and Ahn and Powell (1993)).
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geneity along the selection margins I estimate a new object which corresponds to the treatment
effect of incarceration for those convicted under a given threshold, and who are at the margin of
incarceration. Unconditional treatment effects cannot be identified without further assumptions.
This weaker identification result is, however, economically relevant: It allows me to estimate the
causal effect of incarceration conditional on conviction under a specific conviction leniency. In
this empirical exercise, however, I do not find different treatment effects of incarceration along the
conviction margin.
To understand the importance of this object, consider a situation in which DNA evidence or
phone location records become available in court to decide on conviction. This may change the
size and pool of individuals who are found guilty, and as a result treatment effect of incarceration
for the new convicted population may also change. This result is also relevant outside the incar-
ceration context. For example, when estimating the returns to STEM versus non-STEM majors, it
is important to compare students who had the same underlying probability of attending college. In
the framework of my model, we can think of this situation as first deciding on attending college,
and then, conditional on college attendance, choosing STEM or non-STEM majors. The returns to
STEM may be a function of the underlying probability of attending college.
Contemporaneous to the writing of this article, three papers exploiting judge leniency as an
instrument have provided different results using data from Norway, Sweden and Ohio in the US.
Dobbie et al. (2019) and Bhuller et al. (2018) find imprecise null effects of parental incarceration
on academic achievement for Sweden and Norway, respectively.6 For Cleveland, Ohio, Norris et
al. (2019) find null effects in test scores or grade repetition, but find that parental incarceration
causes children to live in higher socio-economic status neighborhoods as adults, and decreases the
likelihood that a child is incarcerated.
6There are many differences between Colombia and Scandinavian countries, some of which may drive these dif-
ferent results. First, the size of the treatment is larger in Colombia, where on average prison sentences are 4.4 years,
compared with three and eight months in Sweden and Norway, respectively. A second key difference is the potential
size of the effects on schooling before college: In Colombia, 31% of the population between 25 and 34 years old has
less than a high school degree, whereas this number is 17% for both Norway and Sweden (OECD, 2016). Finally,
Norway and Sweden have very generous welfare programs and better education systems compared to those available
in Colombia; these programs help insure disadvantaged children and would also point toward smaller treatment effects
in the Scandinavian countries.
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These results are somewhat in contrast to the large positive effects I find for Colombia. Such
heterogeneity points to the importance of understanding the settings and the population who iden-
tify the treatment effect in each context. Two key differences can help reconcile these results: first,
given the higher incarceration rate in the US, and the lower crime rates in both the Scandinavian
countries and the US compared to Colombia, the parents who are incarcerated at the margin in
Colombia are more negatively selected than in the US, Norway, or Sweden, in terms of the sever-
ity of the crime, but also in terms of income and education. Second, unlike the other papers, my
sample consists only of children who lived with their parent prior to the incarceration episode. In
the US, half of the parents were not living with their children at the time of incarceration (Parke
and Clarke-Stewart, 2002), and as a result the scope for positive effects from removing a parent is
very limited. Consistent with this view, other papers that focus on parents living with their children
in the US find results similar to mine. Cho (2009) finds that children in Chicago’s public schools
whose mothers went to prison instead of jail for less than one week are less likely to experience
grade retention. Using an event study design, Billings (2018) finds that incarceration improves
end-of-grade exams and behavioral outcomes. He also finds, as I do, larger benefits when the
mother is the incarcerated parent.
My paper also contributes to the literature on how parents affect their children’s outcomes.
This includes a large body of papers on the intergenerational effects of human capital (Black et al.,
2005; Oreopoulos et al., 2006), wealth (Black et al., 2015), and welfare receipt (Dahl et al., 2014),
among other variables. Specifically, my paper contributes to the literature on household structure
and children’s outcomes, and shows that living with a parent is not always better for children.7
Finlay and Neumark (2010) study whether marriage is good for children, and find that unobserved
factors drive the negative relationship between never-married motherhood and child education.8 In
addition, there is mixed evidence on the effects of removing children from their parents and placing
7Also see Lang and Zagorsky (2001) who find little evidence that a parent’s presence during childhood affects
economic well being in adulthood.
8There is also a literature in sociology on the effects of marital conflict and divorce on children’s well-being. Using
longitudinal data, Amato et al. (1995) find that in high-conflict families, children have higher levels of well-being as
young adults if their parents divorce rather than stay together.
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them in foster care; for South Carolina Roberts (2018) finds positive effects on schooling, Bald et
al., (2019) find mixed results across gender and age for Rhode Island, and Doyle (2007, 2008)
find negative labor market and crime outcomes for Illinois. My paper contributes to this body of
literature with evidence that suggests that children may benefit from the absence of a convicted
parent who is at the margin of incarceration.
Finally, my results highlight the importance of parenting, and specifically the costs of bad par-
ents. This calls for a greater governmental role in assisting children from fragile households. In-
terventions that offer after-school activities can mitigate these costs. Early childhood interventions
have been remarkably successful in complementing parental care in very disadvantaged popula-
tions (Heckman et al, 2010). These programs can be a starting point to improve the parenting
environment of this population.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background on the judicial
system in Colombia, and Section 3 describes the data sources and provides summary statistics.
Section 4 describes a model to identify causal effects in my setup, Section 5 presents my estimation
and results, and Section 6 discusses the results, the mechanism and external validity. Section 7
concludes.
2.2 Background: The Colombian Court System
In this section, I describe the criminal justice system in Colombia: how defendants are processed,
how cases are assigned to judges, the types of crimes involved, and the stages of a standard trial.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how defendants are processed in Colombia’s criminal justice system.9 A
criminal record is created when an arrest is made. Once this happens, the police and a randomly
assigned prosecutor must present the evidence that motivated the arrest in front of a judge within
36 hours. This judge, who is randomly assigned from the lowest tier of the judicial hierarchy,
determines whether the arrest was legal and whether the defendant should await trial in prison.10
9Acuerdo CSJ, 3329.
10A defendant will go to prison before trial when at least one of the following conditions holds: i) the defendant is
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Next, the case is randomly assigned to another judge who will preside over the trial—this is the
judge who provides the exogenous variation in conviction and incarceration I use in this paper. In
practice, once the first judge decides to continue with the prosecution of a defendant, the case is
entered immediately into a software program that assigns a judge at random among the judges in
the judicial district and at the court level that the case is designated to; I refer to the district/court
level as the “randomization unit.”
Colombia is divided into 33 judicial districts. In the largest cities, a district usually encom-
passes the city’s metropolitan area, and for the rest of the country, it usually corresponds to a state.
Depending on the severity of the charge(s), a case will be randomized within one out of three pos-
sible court levels within the judicial district in which the crime was committed. The first level,
municipal courts, receive simple cases, such as misdemeanors, property crimes involving small
amounts, and simple assault cases. These cases account for 38% of the data. More severe crimes,
such as violent crimes, drug- or gun-related crimes, and large property crimes are sent to circuit
courts (56%). Lastly, the most severe types of crime, such as aggravated homicide or terrorism, are
assigned to a specialized judge (6%).11 On average, there are 20 judges per randomization unit,
and the largest district—Bogota—has 55 judges.
Once the judge is assigned, the prosecutor and defense present their arguments to the judge over
the course of multiple hearings. The purpose of the first hearing is to formally press charges. In a
second hearing, prosecution and defense present all relevant evidence. Next, based on the strength
of the evidence, on a third hearing the judge decides on conviction. If the defendant is found
guilty, the judge holds a final hearing to determine sentence length and incarceration considering
the severity of the crime, potential future harm to society and any aggravating or mitigating factors.
The Colombian Penal Code establishes minimum and maximum sentences for each crime, but
there is significant discretion on the part of the judge. The general sentencing guidelines range is
often quite broad. For example, prison time for possession of 100 grams of cocaine is between
a danger to society, ii) the defendant can interfere with the judicial investigation, or iii) there is reason to believe that
the defendant will not appear in court for trial. Art 308. Criminal Proceedings Code.
11Art 35-37, Criminal Proceedings Code.
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five and nine years (Penal Code, Art 376). The judge also determines the crime and severity of the
charge the defendant will ultimately be sentenced for —for example, murder versus involuntary
manslaughter.
The decision to send a defendant to prison is determined by the length of the sentence. To deal
with prison overcrowding, those convicted only serve time in prison when the sentence is longer
than a certain threshold.12 This threshold is set at the national level and has increased overtime.
Currently, a sentence equal to four years or less is not served in prison.13 As a result, the population
that faces a trial is divided into three groups: i) not convicted; ii) convicted and not incarcerated;
and iii) convicted and incarcerated. The fact that a portion of the convicted population does not
serve time in prison is not a special feature of the Colombian penal system; for example, it is
comparable to a sentence of probation in the US.
In Colombia, judges are selected based on their performance on an exam from an open call of
attorneys, with specific legal experience requirements for each category of judge. Appointments
do not have term limits, and it is common that, over time, judges rise within the judicial hierarchy.
The average tenure of a judge is six years, and on average, a judge presides over 344 cases.
While in prison, inmates can receive visits from adults once a week and from their children
once a month. The government does not provide special welfare assistance to inmates’ families.
Unlike in the US, being convicted of a crime does not change one’s eligibility for welfare benefits,
and in the labor market, it is not common practice to ask about previous convictions, although this
information is available online.
12This feature is not unique to the Colombian setting(e.g. Italy) and can also be compared to a probation sentence.
13In these cases, the only consequence of being convicted is that for the duration of the sentence, the judge must
be notified of any change of address or if the convict plans to travel outside the country. Art 63 Penal Code, and Ley
1709 de 2014.
57
2.3 Data Construction
2.3.1 Data sources
I collect data from several sources. First, I use two waves of Colombia’s census of potential
beneficiaries of welfare (SISBEN). These data are collected by the government to characterize
the country’s poor population and to target social programs to them. SISBEN has information on
national identification numbers (NINs), household structure, age, gender, education, labor force
participation of each household member, and a large set of variables on characteristics and assets
of each house (e.g., refrigerator, stove, and floor material, among others). With this information,
the government creates a score for each household that summarizes its level of wealth. The score
is used to determine eligibility for most public programs—for example, free health insurance,
conditional cash transfers, nutrition programs, subsidized housing, and college loans, among many
others (Bottia et al., 2012). The first wave, conducted from 2003 to 2005, has data on 31.9 million
citizens; the second wave, conducted from 2008 to 2010, has data on 25.6 million citizens.
From this database, I obtain two key elements for my analysis. First, I observe parent and child
links when they live in the same household. Second, I use parents’ NINs to scrape criminal records
that are public and available online. Anecdotal evidence for Colombia suggests that a large share
of children with an incarcerated parent were not living with the parent at the time of the crime. My
target population is, however, likely to be the most affected by parental incarceration.14
In Colombia, criminal records from defendants who are convicted are public and available
online for 17 out of 33 judicial districts. These 17 districts represent 67% of the population, 69%
of homicides, and 83% of property crimes; they include the largest cities in the country; and they
are richer and more urban than the 16 districts without data online.15 Each criminal record includes
the name and NIN of the defendant, crime, date of crime, sentence information, and the court type
14Given how my parent-to-child links are constructed, I focus on parents who are living with the children rather
than the biological parents. This definition includes stepchildren when the parent identifies the child as his or her child
instead of describing themselves as not being related to the child.
15The universe of judicial sentences is public; however, they are only available in the nation’s National Archives.
Criminal records for Bogota´ can be found at the following link:
http://procesos.ramajudicial.gov.co/jepms/bogotajepms/conectar.asp
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and number that handled the case. I collected data on court directories and court identifiers to link
each record to a specific judge. There is only one judge per courtroom but judges change over
time, I construct the tenure of each judge at each courtroom to assign cases to judges.
I complement these data with individual-level, anonymized records from the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office. This database has information on the universe of criminal cases (including cases that
did not result in a conviction), along with courtroom identifiers, date of trial, final verdict, and gen-
der and age of the defendant. I use this information to construct a measure of conviction stringency
at the judge level. Finally, I use administrative records of public school enrollment for 2005-2016
with names and NINs to construct a measure of educational attainment. Children’s educational
attainment is capped at 11, which is the last year of high school in Colombia.
2.3.2 Sample
To construct my sample, I proceed as follows: From SISBEN, I take the NINs of all parents living
with their children in the 17 districts that have information online and web-scrape their criminal
records. This adds up to 17 million adults. For computational reasons, I only search for records in
the district where the person was living at the time of the SISBEN survey. To assess the number of
records I miss due to this restriction, I take a 5% random sample and look for their criminal records
in all 17 districts. From this, I estimate that I miss 8.6% of the sample due to crimes committed in
districts different from the one found in SISBEN. My sample, therefore, includes only poor parents
who, at the time of the SISBEN survey, lived with their children, lived in the largest districts of the
country, and committed crimes in the district in which they were living.
I find 328,579 criminal records for 256,108 individuals, of which 63,654 have missing fields
in at least one of the key variables, such as court identifier, crime, year, or sentence. Half of these
records with missing data correspond to Medellin, which is the second largest district after Bogota,
and has missing court identifiers in all of their records. I keep only crimes committed after 2005
and after the year of the first SISBEN year records, which results in 193,520 records.16 Next, I
16In 2005, there was a reform in the judicial system that renders the two periods incomparable. In the previous
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drop all records from court levels for which there was only one judge (5,963 cases dropped), and
also in cases in which the number of records per judge in a year is fewer than 15 (44,806). I also
only keep courtrooms for which I have judge/year conviction rates from the Attorney General’s
Office database. This leaves me with 128,792 criminal records from 105,133 adults. I retain only
the first conviction in my sample, and collect data on the crime, courtroom identifier, and decisions
regarding sentence and incarceration.17 I merge the criminal records back into the SISBEN data
and keep only the first parental conviction in the household. My final data set consists of 91,032
convicted parents.
I link these data to two outcome variables for these children: educational attainment and crimi-
nal records. I find school records for 77% of them, similar to the share of children between ages 12
and 17 who attend school (76%, 2005 Census). I also search for criminal records for all children of
convicted parents who were 18 years of age by 2017. My final data set consists of 52,419 children
born between 1992 and 2007 who have a convicted parent. In the following section, I characterize
the population of convicted and incarcerated individuals, as well as their households and children.
2.3.3 Summary statistics
The population in my sample is negatively selected along three margins: education, income and
criminal activity. In Table 1, I present socioeconomic characteristics for adults in the overall pop-
ulation, for parents in SISBEN with and without a conviction, and for parents with a conviction,
by incarceration status. By comparing column 1 and columns 2 and 3, we see that parents in the
SISBEN have fewer years of education, are less likely to have a high school degree, live in larger
households, and are more likely to be single than all adults. Among parents in the SISBEN, indi-
viduals with a conviction are also negatively selected across a host of variables (column 3 relative
to column 2). Convicted adults have fewer years of schooling, are less likely to have a high school
system, a judge served as both prosecutor and judge at the same time, and he or she was anonymous to the defendant.
Additionally, at the time of this reform, there were other changes put in place regarding sentencing guidelines.
17I only keep the first parental conviction to able able to assign the child a unique conviction/incarceration and
leniency value.
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degree or more (23% vs. 31%), and have lower income scores. They also live in larger households
and are more likely to be single (41% vs. 35%, respectively). Adults with criminal records are
disproportionately male (84%), they are more likely to work and to be the head of the household
than those without a criminal record.18
Among convicted parents, incarcerated parents have lower education and lower income levels
(columns 4 and 5). Gender differences in the probability of incarceration conditional on conviction
are far smaller than those in conviction. Incarceration is associated with lower probabilities of
working, as well as being the head of the household. Table 2.2 splits the sample by gender. On
average, convicted women have lower levels of education relative to convicted men, and they tend
to come from poorer households. Compared to men, women are less likely to be the head of the
household; yet they are still much more likely to be the heads of their respective households than
in the country’s overall female population (36% vs. 29%, respectively). Convicted women are also
more likely to be single.
Property crimes are the most common type of offense (25%), followed closely by drug-
trafficking crimes (24%). Violent crimes account for 20% of the records, followed by gun-
trafficking and misdemeanor offenses at 18% and 12%, respectively. Incarceration rates vary
substantially by crime. Figure 2.2 ranks crimes by their incarceration rates for selected crimes.
Serious crimes, such as kidnapping or rape, have the highest incarceration rates, whereas failure to
pay child support, simple assault, and property damage have the lowest. In the middle of the distri-
bution, we find crimes such as drug trafficking, domestic violence, counterfeit currency trafficking,
theft, and smuggling, among others.
2.4 Identification
Children from households with incarcerated parents are disadvantaged along many dimensions.
As a result, simple comparisons of outcomes of children with and without incarcerated parents
18In the US context, for example, 29% of parents in state prisons have a high school degree or more, 48% are single,
92% are male, and the median age is 32 (Mumola, 2000).
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would lead to negatively biased estimates of the effects of parental incarceration. A common way
to address this endogeneity concern is to exploit the random assignment of defendants to judges
who differ in their leniency to incarcerate.19 The intuition of this identification approach is that
for a group of defendants on the margin, their incarceration decision will only be determined by
whether they were assigned to a harsh or lenient judge.
In this literature, authors have data on the pool of cases randomly assigned across judges and
use this to construct their incarceration instrument, as the share incarcerated by each judge —the
leave-out mean. They compare incarcerated defendants with non-incarcerated defendants, which
includes those who were not convicted as well as those who were convicted but did not receive a
prison sentence. These two stages, however, correspond to different policy margins. Conviction
is about prosecution and criminal investigation efforts, and incarceration on the other hand, is a
matter of punishment or rehabilitation.
In my setting, I only observe defendants who are convicted and conviction is determined after
random assignment to a judge, so the observed sample of convicted defendants is not balanced
across judges. To address this challenge, I provide a new identification result for a setting in which
sample selection invalidates the exogeneity of an instrument. Using the technology in Lee and
Salanie (2018), my result extends the insight in Ahn and Powell (1993) to a setting with hetero-
geneous treatment effects, where I also relax the assumptions on scalar unobservables, linearity in
the choice equation, and separability in the outcomes equation. This approach has the additional
advantage of estimating a treatment effect of incarceration that has a closer link to policy makers
concerns than the one previously estimated in the literature. Instead of comparing incarceration to
conviction without incarceration and to those who were found innocent, I only compare incarcer-
ated to the former. In the following section I provide intuition for the identification, after which I
formalize this result.
19See Kling (2006); Aizer and Doyle (2015); Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013); Mueller-Smith (2015); and Bhuller
et al. (2016), among others.
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2.4.1 A simplified framework
To fix ideas, let us consider the following framework: Judges are randomly assigned to defendants
to make conviction and incarceration decisions by evaluating two distinct attributes of the defen-
dant. When deciding on conviction C, a judge assesses the strength of the evidence of the case at
hand. Without loss of generality, the distribution of the strength of the evidence across defendants
Uc is uniform [0,1], where zero is the smoking gun and one is no evidence against the defendant.
The judge can be one of two types in conviction: harsh (Hc) or lenient (Lc). Harsh judges do not
require much evidence to convict a defendant. They have a threshold of 0.8, and thus they convict
80% of defendants; this corresponds to all defendants with a level of evidence below 0.8. Lenient
judges require more evidence to convict a defendant, choosing a threshold of 0.2, such that they
convict only 20%.
Next, if a defendant is convicted, the judge decides on incarceration I. The judge makes this
decision based on an assessment of how harmful the convicted defendant may be to society, and
how much punishment the defendant deserves. This trait, which I denote U I , is also distributed
uniformly [0,1]. Very harmful defendants have low values of U I , and non-harmful defendants
have values close to 1. Again, regarding incarceration a judge can be either lenient or harsh.
A harsh judge (HI) would send 70% of convicted defendants to prison, whereas a lenient one
(LI) would only incarcerate 30%. It is the same judge making both decisions so a judge can be
of one of four types. Figure 2.3 illustrates this situation. The x-axis traces the strength of the
evidence the conviction decision is based on. That is, we can order defendants along one relevant
dimension—namely, the strength of the evidence in the [0,1] interval. A judge splits the space into
two when she or he sets her or his conviction rate: Defendants to the right are free, and defendants
to the left are convicted. Similarly, the y-axis traces the defendant’s punishment level, which is
related to the assessment of predicted future criminal activity; unobserved—to the econometrician,
not the judge—crime severity; and any mitigating/aggravating factors or family ties.20 I refer
20As mentioned above, sentencing laws guide the judge’s incarceration decisions; however, there is large scope for
discretion, even within a specific crime. What this dimension tries to capture are the factors that cause a judge to make
different incarceration decisions for criminals who have the same charges.
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to this dimension as a measure of the defendants’ overall quality. For a fixed level of evidence
required for conviction, a judge’s incarceration level splits the space of convicted individuals into
two: A defendant below the threshold will go to prison, and a defendant above will not.
Due to randomization, all judges start with a statistically identical pool of defendants. How-
ever, after the conviction decision is made, the pool of convicted defendants is no longer compa-
rable across judges with different conviction thresholds. Defendants convicted under a judge who
requires solid evidence to convict will have, on average, a stronger case against them than those
convicted under a judge who convicts even under weak evidence of guilt.
Defendants convicted under a harsh judge can face two types of judges [Hc,HI] or [Hc,LI)],
where the first term refers to the judge’s conviction stringency, and the second refers to the in-
carceration stringency. Similarly, those convicted under lenient judges can also have judges of
types [Lc,HI] and [Lc,LI]. Within these partitions, defendants are balanced across judges: first,
because they were randomly assigned to their judge, and second, because they were selected into
conviction under the same threshold. As a result, within partitions, there is exogenous variation
in the probability of going to prison. For example, convicted defendants who were assigned to a
[Hc,LI] judge face a 30% chance of incarceration, whereas those assigned to a [Hc,HI] judge face
a 70% probability. Figure 2.4 illustrates this argument. This means that for 40% of defendants
whose harmfulness assessment is located above the worst 30% of the population, but still in the
bottom 70%, incarceration is only a function of judge assignment. Thus, I will be able to estimate
LATE-type parameters for defendants who fall into this range.
Specifically, for this example I estimate the following two LATE parameters:
LATEHc = E[Y (tI)−Y (tc)|Uc < 0.8,0.3 <U I < 0.7]
and,
LATELc = E[Y (tI)−Y (tc)|Uc < 0.2,0.3 <U I < 0.7]
64
Where LATEHc is the causal effect of incarceration relative to conviction for those convicted
under a harsh judge (Uc < 0.8), and LATELc is the one for conviction under a lenient judge. Y (tI)
and Y (tc) represent counterfactual outcomes (years of education of the child) for incarceration (I)
and conviction (C), and Uc traces the selection on the conviction stage.
LATEHc =
E[Y |Hc,HI]−E[Y |Hc,LI]
E[T = I|Hc,HI]−E[T = I|Hc,LI]
Where T = I in the denominator represents treatment assignment equal to incarceration. Similarly,
we can have the analogous expression for LATELc .
2.5 Estimation
To apply the identification result of the previous section, I start by estimating the sample analogs
of Pc(Z) and P∗I (Z) in the model. The interpretation of these variables is the probability of being
convicted/incarcerated, given the assignment to a specific judge. Following the literature, these
are estimated as judge fixed effects from regressions after parsing out variation at the unit at
which the randomization of judges occurred and specific case characteristics. That is, the con-
viction/incarceration decision can be decomposed into a portion that is related to the individual,
the judge, the offense, and the randomization unit/year. I do this as follows:
Ditorz = γrt+ γo+ εitorz
Where Ditorz corresponds to a conviction or incarceration dummy, i indexes individuals, t year,
o offense, r court-level/judicial district and z judge. γrt corresponds to randomization-level fixed
effects, which is a court-level/judicial-district by year-level fixed effect. γo is a offense-level fixed
effect (161 different crimes); and εitorz is a mean zero term. Following the literature, I estimate the
judge instrument p̂z−i for defendant i to be the following leave-out estimator:
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p̂zi =
1
nz−1∑k 6=i
r̂esz,k
where nz is the number of cases of judge z, and reszk is the residual from a regression of the
conviction/incarceration dummy on γrt and γo.
Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of Ditor at the judge level, and p̂z for both conviction and
incarceration. From the graph, we can see that although court-level/year and crime-level fixed
effects explain most of the variation, judge’s fixed effects still represent a sizable share of the
variance in conviction and incarceration.
2.5.1 Instrument validity
Next, I examine how much judge fixed effects predict individual-level decisions by estimating a
first-stage regression, as follows:
Ditorz = β0+ p̂zi+β1Xi+ εitorz
As before, Ditorz corresponds to the conviction or incarceration dummy, and pz is the leave-out
mean of judge z assigned to person i. I run this regression with and without controls Xi. In the
conviction regression, where I use anonymized data from the Attorney General’s Office, I can only
control for age, gender, and number of crimes charged. In the incarceration regression, I control
for schooling, income, occupation, gender, year of birth, and year in the survey. According to the
results in Table 2.3, judges have a strong influence on conviction and incarceration decisions. The
estimates are highly significant and suggest that being assigned to a judge with a 10 percentage
point higher conviction/incarceration rate increases the defendant’s probability of conviction and
incarceration by seven and eight percentage points, respectively. This relationship is robust to
the inclusion of controls, as expected by random assignment. Figure 2.6 depicts this first-stage
relationship for conviction (left panel) and incarceration (right panel). These graphs show a strong
positive relationship between the instrument and individual trial decisions. The F-stats on the first
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stage correspond to regressions on judge dummy variables to account for the true dimensionality
of the instruments. These F-stats are above the critical value for the leave-out mean instrument
for weak instruments (see Figure 4 in Stock et al., 2002). See Section 5.4 for a further discussion
about the F-stat.
Recall from the previous section that the variation in incarceration stringency conditional on a
level of conviction stringency is what identifies treatment effects in this context. Figure 2.7 shows
a scatter plot of both conviction and incarceration fixed effects. From the graph we can see that
there is substantial variation along the incarceration axis for each conviction rate.
For the instrument to be valid, the judge’s fixed effects must be orthogonal to the defendant’s
characteristics. I test this in the anonymized data from the Attorney General’s Office, where the
universe of cases the judge has heard is available. Table 2.4 checks the balance across defendants
for my judge-stringency measures for conviction and incarceration. Across gender, age, and type of
crime—which are the only variables available in these data—I find no individual or joint statistical
significance. In addition, the identification result is supported by the observation that once Pc
is fixed, the pool of convicted defendants is balanced across judges. I test whether covariates
are associated with incarceration stringency for the convicted sample, once I split the sample by
conviction group (low, medium, or high) or control for the conviction level with a polynomial of
Pc. In Table 2.5, I test the individual and joint significance of variables associated with education,
income, and occupation status, and find no evidence of a relationship with judge stringency.
To interpret the results of the IV as the causal effect of incarceration, judge stringency must
only affect child’s outcomes through incarceration. This may not be the case if the judge fixed
effects capture other dimensions of trial decisions, such as fines or guilt (Mueller-Smith, 2017).
In my setting, this is less of a concern because in the case of Colombia, fines are rare and only
associated with large property crimes; and because I model the conviction decision directly.
Finally, I also require that conviction or incarceration decisions made by a lenient judge would
also have been made by a stricter judge; this is called the monotonicity assumption. One testable
implication of monotonicity is that first-stage estimates should be non-negative for all sub-samples
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(Bhuller et al, 2016). That is for example if a judge is lenient, he or she is going to be lenient for
both women and men, and for both violent crimes and nonviolent crimes. To test this assumption, I
construct judge fixed effects for just one group in the population, for example, for men and use this
fixed effect in a first-stage regression to predict individual conviction and incarceration for women.
I do this for gender, type of crime, and age group. I find positive first-stage estimates across all
slices of the data, which supports the monotonicity assumption. However, if only these weaker
monotonicity holds inference is constrained. In particular, it does not allow for the identification
of marginal effects along the entire distribution of judge propensities, as can be achieved in the
conventional framework. The weaker assumptions rely on averaging across the entire set of judges,
while identification of marginal effects throughout the distribution requires assumptions to hold
judge by judge (Norris, 2019). In Table 2.6 I test pairwise monotonicity following Norris (2019)
and find I can not reject monotonicity across individuals characteristics, and it is only rejected
for property vs not property crimes.21 Finally, Frandsen et al (2019) show that under the usual
assumptions, average outcomes by judge will be a continuous function with bounded slope of judge
propensities to incarcerate. Intuitively, if this is not the case, it implies that either judges influence
outcomes beyond their propensity to assign treatment, or judges disagree on their implicit ordering
of which defendants should be treated. Based on that result, they develop a test that jointly test
violations to the monotonicity assumption and the exclusion restriction. In Table 2.7 I implement
their test and I find there is no evidence of violation of this assumption.
2.5.2 Results
Following the identification result, I need to account for the different levels of conviction stringency
at which defendants were found guilty. I do this in two ways: First, I sort my data by stringency
in the conviction stage (Pc) and split the sample into terciles: low (0.7 < Pc < 0.88), medium
(0.88 < Pc < 0.9), and high (0.9 < Pc < 1) conviction levels. Second, I pool the data and add a
second-degree polynomial on Pc with interaction terms. This last estimate can be interpreted as
21I split judge leniency across this characteristic and find very similar point estimates.
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an average effect across the different conviction thresholds. The first column of Tables 2.8 and
2.9 show the pooled regression, and the following three columns show the regressions for the split
sample.
I begin by showing the OLS estimate of this design. Table 2.8 shows a regression of parental
incarceration on years of education. Following Abadie et al. (2017), I cluster standard errors at the
randomization level. Without controls, a child whose parent went to prison has around 0.3 fewer
years of schooling than a child whose parent did not. Once I add controls, this difference reduces
drastically to less than 0.1 years. Still, we expect that incarcerated parents are negatively selected
on unobservables that cannot be accounted for, so -0.1 years is a lower bound on the causal effect.
Next, Figure 2.8 shows a graphical representation of the reduced-form regression. This graph
plots the distribution of judges’ incarceration fixed effects against the predicted years of education
from a local polynomial regression. From the graph, we can see that there is a strong positive
relationship between judge stringency in incarceration and years of education. That is, as we move
to the right, where the probability of having a parent in prison increases exogenously, I estimate
that the years of education also increase. The top panel of Table 2.9 shows the regression results for
this reduced form: I estimate large increases in years of education for all specifications the increase
in years of education is statistically significant. Finally, the bottom panel of Table 2.9 shows results
from the IV; I estimate that having an incarcerated parent increases years of schooling by around
0.7 years on average for all convictions levels. These estimates are statistically different from zero.
I find that the increase in years of education is mostly accrued through higher graduation rate from
middle school. There are positive treatment effects for all grades, but the effect is larger for 9th
grade which corresponds to the last grade of middle school.
I also study how parental incarceration affects the chance that the child is later convicted of
a crime. For this exercise, I restrict the data to children who were 18 years old by 2017, so that
their criminal records would be public. Figure ?? graphically depicts reduced-form estimates of
judge stringency on conviction probability; the effect is close to zero. However, the analysis is
under-powered to detect to estimate reasonably sized treatment effects. This is not surprising,
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since conviction is a low incidence event; only 1.6% of children had a criminal record, and the
difference in the OLS is only 0.1 pp.
2.5.3 Heterogeneity
I this section I examine the heterogeneity of the results along observables and unobservables.
In my context, marginal treatment effects (MTE) are particularly interesting, because they trace
the causal effect of incarceration along parents’ unobserved characteristics (U I) that matter for
incarceration and that are correlated with defendants’ quality, broadly defined. What this exercise
does is to evaluate the possibility of different effects of parental incarceration given the type of
defendant that is going to prison, which is characterized by his or her location along the y-axis of
Figure 2.3. The intuition is as follows: Parents who are incarcerated under the most lenient judges
have worse characteristics than those incarcerated under strict judges. In other words, a strict
judge incarcerates almost everyone, but a lenient judge incarcerates only the worst defendants,
so that those incarcerated under relatively lenient judges are more negatively selected.22 I follow
Heckman and Vitlacyl (2005) to estimate this MTE. Under stronger monotonicity assumptions, I
find that at the 5% level, there are heterogeneous treatment effects along parental quality (Figure
2.9). Specifically, I find that the positive effects of incarceration on schooling accrue when the
worst defendants go to prison.
The magnitude of the effect of parental incarceration on children’s education is a function of
the relationship between the parent and the child prior to the incarceration episode, the type or
quality of this parent, and the role of the child in the household. To document this heterogeneity,
I estimate the IV regression for different subgroups in the data. Following previous literature in
economics, as well as that in psychology and sociology, I estimate different regressions by gender
of the child, gender of the parent, child’s age at the time of the incarceration episode, birth order,
and the nature of the offense—violent, property, drug- or gun-related, and misdemeanor. In Table
22I look at this empirically and find that among incarcerated defendants, those incarcerated under stricter judges
tend to have fewer and less severe charges. This follows almost directly from the definition of leniency, but also helps
to illustrate the way in which these defendants are better.
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2.10 I show IV results for the pooled model for these different groups in the data.
According to the estimates, the benefits of parental incarceration are larger for boys than girls,
and this difference is statistically significant. Specifically, I find that boys’ schooling increases by
0.86 years, whereas girls’ schooling increases by 0.36 years. This result is consistent with previous
research in psychology and economics, which documents that boys are more vulnerable than girls
to negative experiences in the household (Bertrand & Pan (2013); Autor et al. (2016); Parke &
Clarke-Stewart (2002); Hetherington et al., 1998). Specifically, Autor et al. find that boys, relative
to their sisters, have higher rates of disciplinary problems, lower achievement scores, and fewer
high school completions when growing up in disadvantaged environments.
I split the sample by gender of the parent and find that incarceration is more beneficial in cases
in which the mother is the one going to prison. This result might be surprising at first glance.
However, it is important to bear in mind that children’s well-being is more closely affected by their
mothers’ behavior because of their main role as primary caregivers, and that criminal women are
more negatively selected than criminal men (Table 2.2). This result is consistent with the findings
of previous research in the US, where Billings (2018) and Turanovic et al. (2012) estimate larger
positive effects from maternal incarceration.23
A source of heterogeneity associated with the quality of the parent going to prison is the type of
crime they committed. Thus, in the lower panel of Table 2.10 I split the sample by crime categories:
violent, property, drug-related and gun-related. The largest benefits are observed for defendants
convicted for violent crimes, whereas the smaller benefits are for property crimes. These differ-
ences, however, are not statistically significant. Nonetheless, this is in line with the previous result
on unobserved heterogeneity, in which the positive effects are a function of how good the defendant
is as a parent.
Lastly, I look at heterogeneous effects depending on the age of the child at the time of parental
conviction. I split the sample into three groups: children who were 0 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, and
23It is also the case that in the US, incarcerated women have worse socioeconomic backgrounds than incarcerated
men (Harrison & Beck, 2006). In addition, Glaze and Maruschak (2008) survey incarcerated parents and find that
60% of imprisoned mothers, compared to 16% of fathers, have histories of being physically or sexually abused.
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11 to 15 years at the time of parental conviction. I find a U pattern in the effects on schooling.
Studies in developmental psychology conclude that children in the first age group are the most
vulnerable, as they do not yet have the abilities and skills to process trauma on their own (Johnston,
1995). These skills and abilities develop over time, and help children cope with distress. On the
other hand, the increase in the positive effect in the later years may be the result of how salient the
decision is to continue in school or drop out at older ages.
2.5.4 Robustness
In this section I go over various exercises that evaluate the robustness of the results in the paper
along different dimensions.
In Table 2.3 I report the first-stage regression on incarceration, and in the bottom of the table
I report the F-test on the excluded instruments. This F-test corrects for the fact that the dimen-
sionality of the instrument is the number of judges and not one (my measure of judge leniency).
With this correction, the F-stats are low, but above the critical values for weak instruments. The
consequence of weak instruments is that 2SLS-IV estimates will be biased toward the OLS (Stock
et al., 2002). In my context, given that the OLS estimates are negative, the bias of the OLS is
also negative, and the 2SLS IV estimates are positive, this means that we could expect even larger
positive effects. To assess the size of this residual bias, I estimate the IV using the LIML estimator,
which is less sensitive to weak instruments—the bias does not increase with the number of instru-
ments (Rothenberg, 1993; Stock et al., 2002). I find that the 2SLS and LIML estimator are very
close and both are around a point estimate of 0.8 years.
In the Results section, I show my preferred specifications for the estimates of the effect of
parental incarceration on educational attainment. This decision to split the sample into three groups
of Pc was arbitrary. To assess the robustness of the results, in Figure ?? I instead order observations
along Pc, and run multiple regressions on a rolling window of 18,000 observations over Pc, moving
the window 500 observations each time. I estimate that for each sample, I find a positive effect of
incarceration on education.
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Lastly, as a placebo check, I evaluate whether there are differences in schooling for children of
incarcerated versus non-incarcerated parents before the date of the sentence. I estimate that there is
no supporting evidence that the positive effects I estimate are the result of preexisting differences
in educational attainment.
2.6 Mechanisms
2.6.1 What explains the positive effect?
The results presented here suggest that living with a convicted parent has negative consequences
for their children. There are many reasons to believe that this is plausible. First, criminals are more
likely to exert psychological and physical violence at home, and this can often be detrimental to a
child’s well-being. In the US context, Western et al. (2004) find that incarcerated men engage in
domestic violence at a rate about four times higher than the rest of the population. Furthermore,
research in psychology documents that spending time with parents who engage in high levels
of antisocial behavior is associated with more conduct problems for their children (Jaffee et al.,
2003). This literature concludes that the salutary effects of being raised by married biological
parents depend on the quality of care the parents provide.
Second, Chimeli and Soares (2017) document the causal effect of trading illegal commodities
on violence. In light of their work, we can expect that households that take part in illegal businesses
face constant violence or threats of violence related to guaranteeing property rights or resolving
disputes within the business, all of which affect the quality of life in a household. There is also lit-
erature on the intergenerational transmission of violence, substance abuse, and crime. Specifically,
in the role-model theory, in which children directly observe and model their parents’ behavior,
incarcerating parents could be beneficial, as it removes bad role models from the house and forces
children to update their beliefs about the consequences of criminal behavior (Hjalmarsson and
Lindquist, 2012). Beyond intergenerational transmission, childhood exposure to negative behav-
iors is documented to have direct adverse effects on outcomes in both childhood and adulthood
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(Balsa, 2008; Chatterji and Markowitz, 2000), all of which helps explain the positive estimates in
this paper.
2.6.2 How does the environment of the child change?
To characterize the changes that households and children experience after an episode of incarcer-
ation, I analyze households for which I have two observations in the SISBEN (44% of cases), in
which the parent was convicted of a crime between observations. Appearing in both waves of the
SISBEN is not random; on the contrary, leaving the sample is associated with an improvement in
living standards. This is particularly relevant for children who might be moving to a household
outside of SISBEN after the episode of parental incarceration. With this caveat, Table 2.11 shows
suggestive evidence that incarceration is associated with an increase in labor force participation
(LFP) of the spouse, a worsening of the income score of the household, and a decrease in the
probability of a male as the head of the household. I also find that the probability of living with
grandparents increases and the probability of being in the second wave of SISBEN decreases, sug-
gesting that incarceration induces children to move in with relatives who are better off financially.
2.6.3 Parents at the margin
To derive policy implications, it is important to acknowledge the local feature of my estimates.
This paper estimates the effects of parental incarceration for a particular sub-population: children
of convicted poor parents at the margin of incarceration. A large share of those convicted—for
example, those guilty of murder or rape—would be incarcerated regardless of judge assignment,
and this paper cannot provide any insights into the effects on educational attainment of the children
of those individuals. At the other end of the distribution, defendants convicted of minor crimes
will also avoid prison, regardless of judge assignment. Defendants convicted of drug- or gun-
trafficking, domestic violence, and medium-sized property crimes compose the complier group in
my estimation, and they are the group my estimates apply to. This marginal population, however,
is particularly relevant because it is the population that is more likely to be affected by policy
74
interventions to the criminal justice system. Following Dahl et al. (2014), I find that compliers
make up approximately 29.8% of the sample.24
2.6.4 External validity and policy implications
To assess the external validity of my results, I provide a framework motivated by my heterogeneity
analysis, which links parental quality to parenting treatment effects and the probability of incar-
ceration. Figure 2.10 summarizes this framework. The x-axis traces parental quality; as we move
to the right, parental quality increases. The y-axis measures the treatment effect of parenting:
Having better parents is better for children. Most importantly, however, there is a segment in the
support of parental quality for which parents are detrimental for children. The secondary y-axis
measures incarceration probability: In the model, the probability of being incarcerated decreases
when parental quality increases. Each society chooses a level of incarceration, which is character-
ized by a threshold in the support of parental quality. This threshold determines the average effect
of incarcerating parents (the gray area in Figure 2.10). To determine how much the results in this
paper apply to other settings, we need to think about the location of the incarceration threshold
along the parental quality axis and the shape of the function of the treatment effects’ of parents in
each country. Countries with higher incarceration rates will incarcerate, on average, better parents
than those with lower rates, and as a result we should expect lower benefits or even costs from
parental incarceration. We can also expect a much flatter function of treatment effects of parenting
in generous welfare states, such as the Nordic countries, in which children’s education and health
vary less with parental characteristics. As a consequence, we would find smaller treatment effects
of parental incarceration (both positive and negative). Similarly, some of the estimates in the lit-
24Parental compliers are defendants who would have received a different incarceration decision had their case been
assigned to the most lenient judge instead of the strictest judge. We can define the size of this group (pic) as follows:
pic = Prob(Incarceration= 1|z j = z¯)−Prob(Incarceration= 1|z j = z)
where z¯ and z correspond to the incarceration rates of a judge at the 99th and 1st percentiles, respectively. Because
of monotonicity, the share of parents who would go to prison regardless of the judge assigned to their case—always
takers—is given by the incarceration rate for the most lenient judge and is equal to 22.5%. On the other hand, 47.7%
of the sample are children of never takers who would not go to prison no matter which judge was assigned to their
case. I estimate that children of compliers make up approximately 29.8% of the sample.
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erature (Norris et al 2019 and Dobbie et al 2019) consider birth parents who may not necessarily
co-reside with their children, in this framework we can hypothesized that it translates to smaller
treatment effect of parents and as a result into a smaller effect of parental incarceration.
2.7 Conclusions
The rise in incarceration has led to an increase in the number of children growing up with a parent
in prison. In this paper, I estimate the causal effects of parental incarceration on educational
attainment in Colombia. My results suggest that children benefit when their convicted parents
are incarcerated. Specifically, I estimate that parental incarceration increases schooling by 0.7
years on average.
I conclude with a discussion of three important limitations of this paper. First, I consider only
the short-term effects of parental incarceration. This is important, as these parents eventually leave
prison and will perhaps return to live with their children. Further, if incarceration decreases one’s
human capital and social and emotional skills, the type of parent who returns after incarceration
can be much worse than the one who left. In that case, the long-term effects may be very different
from what I estimate here. Another significant limitation of this paper is that, effectively, I can
only study one outcome variable. As shown by Dobbie et al. (2018), parental incarceration can
have sizable effects on other variables such as earnings and teen pregnancy. These are important
results that help characterize the complex shock of having an incarcerated parent, but due to data
limitations, I cannot explore them here. Finally, my paper only offers suggestive evidence on the
mechanisms that explain the positive effects of parental incarceration on children’s educational at-
tainment, further research is required to characterize the obstacles children face in these households
in order to provide informed policy recommendations.
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2.9 List of Tables
Table 2.1: Population by conviction and incarceration
Sample: Census: SISBEN SISBEN w/ conviction
Adult population Criminal record By incarceration
No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years of education 7.36 6.82 6.68 6.86 6.42
Finished High School D=1 44.0% 31.2% 22.8% 24.2% 20.8%
Income score 34.01 30.90 31.72 29.41
Gender (Male=1) 49.0% 47.6% 83.3% 84.5% 83.3%
# HH members 3.90 4.28 4.47 4.37 4.43
Occupation: Working D=1 48.0% 47.3% 65.4% 67.0% 63.9%
Head of the household D=1 41.2% 47.1% 46.9% 48.6%
Year of birth 1965 1966.9 1974.8 1975.0 1974.3
Marital status: Single D. 45.0% 34.7% 40.7% 45.0% 43.6%
Obs 26,757,687 16,195,178 89,257 55,790 33,467
Years of education for children 8.41 7.20 6.71 6.93 6.57
Notes: Columns 1-5 are group means. HHH: Head of the household, HS: High School. D: Dummy.
Income Score: Score from 0 to 100, calculated using variables on income and education of the members
of the household, size and characteristics of the house. Source: 2005 Census, SISBEN and criminal
records.
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Table 2.2: Convicted parents by incarceration and gender
Convicted sample: by gender and incarceration status Women Men
No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of education 6.50 6.06 6.68 6.23
Dummy Has HS degree =1 20% 16% 22% 19%
Income Score 17.2 16.1 19.48 18.46
Occupation: Dummy Working=1 45% 40% 69% 68%
Dummy head of the household=1 36.2% 37.1% 47% 50%
Age at sentence 35.5 36.2 34.46 36.31
Marital status: Dummy Single=1 47.8% 45.1% 46% 44%
Obs 9,375 6,028 46,415 27,439
Notes: Columns 1-4 are group means. HHH: Head of the household, HS: High School. D:
Dummy. Income Score: Score from 0 to 100, calculated using variables on income and education
of the members of the household, size and characteristics of the house. Source: SISBEN and
criminal records.
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Table 2.3: First stage - Parents
Dep var: Decision Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conviction Conviction Incarceration Incarceration
Judge Stringency 0.782*** 0.718*** 0.792*** 0.786***
[0.0143] [0.0204] [0.0416] [0.0430]
Controls X X
F stat* 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.2
F critical value 4 4 4 4
Obs 233,050 116,062 91,854 90,774
Judges 392 392 262 262
R-sq 0.013 0.029 0.243 0.242
adj. R-sq 0.013 0.029 0.238 0.237
Controls column 2: Randomization unit FE, Gender and age. Controls column 4: Randomiza-
tion unit FE, Gender, YOB FE, Sisben score, year of sentence, court-level and year of survey.
Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level. Sources: Attorney General’s Office,
criminal records and poverty census. F-stat is calculated from a regression on judge dummys.
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Table 2.4: Balance test-Trial sample
Dep. Var: Conviction / Incarceration stringency Judge: Conviction
stringency
Judge: Incarceration strin-
gency
Age 0.0000024 0.00000914
[0.0000208] [0.0000354]
Gender 0.000324 -0.000291
[0.000509] [0.000753]
Number of charges 0.000867 0.000718
[0.000835] [0.00157]
Violent crime -0.000293 0.0014
[0.000805] [0.00129]
Property crime 0.00203 0.00117
[0.00224] [0.00360]
Drugs related crime -0.000927 -0.00189
[0.00157] [0.00271]
Guns related crime -0.000666 -0.00101
[0.00142] [0.00213]
Misdemeanor -0.000867 0.00139
[0.00112] [0.00183]
Obs 187,231 162,960
Judges 1,272 683
F-test 0.52 0.80
Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit/year level. Each rows corresponds to a different
regression of judge leniency and defendant characteristics. When testing balance across crime cate-
gories I construct an alternative measure of conviction stringency that doesn’t parse-out crime level
conviction rates. The F-test corresponds to a regression where I include all the variables at the same
time. Source Attorney General’s office and criminal records.
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Table 2.5: Balance test II-Incarcerated sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep var: Incarceration FE 0.74<Pc<0.88 0.88<Pc<0.9 0.9<Pc<1 Pooled Pc
Years of education -0.0000292 -0.0000215 0.000274 0.00011
[0.000119] [0.000136] [0.000169] [0.0000873]
Income score -0.0000174 0.00000267 0.000013 0.0000106
[0.0000283] [0.0000292] [0.0000364] [0.0000175]
Age at sentence 0.0000218 -2.08E-08 0.0000107 0.0000197
[0.0000338] [0.0000320] [0.0000435] [0.0000266]
Gender -0.00142 0.001 -0.00212** -0.00104
[0.00127] [0.000793] [0.00100] [0.000633]
Years of education HH -0.0000463 0.000106 -0.000153 -0.0000165
[0.000157] [0.000136] [0.000162] [0.0000996]
D: Working -0.0000919 -0.000981 0.000137 -0.000126
[0.000672] [0.000763] [0.00108] [0.000493]
D: Studying -0.0022 -0.000602 0.00103 0.00108
[0.00316] [0.00278] [0.00364] [0.00199]
D: Both census surveys -0.000844 -0.000942 0.000587 -0.000305
[0.000897] [0.000634] [0.000857] [0.000488]
D: First survey 0.000355 0.000691 0.000648 0.000511
[0.00124] [0.00123] [0.00162] [0.000800]
Constant 0.178* -3.04E-01 6.64E-02 0.360***
[0.107] [0.226] [0.124] [0.00594]
F Test 0.8494 0.5001 0.564 0.5763
Obs 16,684 17,416 15,845 49,945
R-sq 0.128 0.149 0.137 0.03
Additional controls: Pc, Randomization unit FE, sentence year FE. Standard errors clustered at the
randomization unit year level.
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Table 2.6: Monotonicity test: Norris
Pairwise Monotonicity Test P-value
Gender 0.33
Primary school 0.99
Young 0.93
Single 0.99
Poor 0.99
Working 0.86
Type of crime:
Violent 0.52
Property 0.00
Gun-related 0.38
Drug-related 0.32
Norris (2019) test for monotonicity.
Table 2.7: Monotonicity Test: Frandsen et al
Randomization
Unit
Critical value P-value
1 28.561 0.435
2 36.685 0.302
3 22.108 0.279
4 11.612 0.071
5 0.698 0.983
6 5.372 0.372
7 1.197 0.754
8 10.637 0.014
9 2.362 0.501
10 4.485 0.214
11 0.465 0.495
12 0.997 0.607
13 0.265 0.876
14 0.007 0.931
15 4.083 0.130
16 3.72 0.156
Joint test 133.254 0.160
Frandsen et al (2019) test for Monotonicty. I run the test in the
randomization units were there are more than 4 judges which cor-
responds to 73% of my sample.
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Table 2.8: OLS Regression
Children with a convicted parent by age 14
OLS: no controls (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep var: Years of education Pooled Pc 0.7<Pc<0.88 0.88<Pc<0.9 0.9<Pc<1
Parental Incarceration Dummy -0.356*** -0.397*** -0.319*** -0.372***
[0.0717] [0.0896] [0.0815] [0.0894]
Constant 6.768*** 6.446*** 6.586*** 6.693***
[0.0976] [0.0857] [0.0806] [0.101]
OLS: Adding controls
Parental Incarceration Dummy -0.0764*** -0.0529 -0.104** -0.0608*
[0.0235] [0.0426] [0.0470] [0.0346]
Obs 52,275 16,091 16,981 16,424
Clusters 609 329 365 403
R-sq 0.383 0.406 0.375 0.364
Controls: Randomization unit FE, Gender, YOB FE, Sisben score, gender of incarcerated
parent, pc, year of sentence, birth order and year of survey. Sample: Children between 1990
and 2007 who had a convicted parent between ages 0 and 14. SE in brackets clustered at the
randomizarion unit. AR confidence interval result in the same significance levels.
Table 2.9: Results: Reduced form and IV
Reduced form (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep var: Years of education Pooled Pc 0.7<Pc<0.88 0.88<Pc<0.9 0.9<Pc<1
Judge leave-out incarceration rate 0.763*** 0.720* 0.901* 0.741**
[0.215] [0.419] [0.503] [0.341]
R-sq 0.298 0.322 0.286 0.292
IV Dep var: Years of education Pooled Pc 0.7<Pc<0.88 0.88<Pc<0.9 0.9<Pc<1
Parental Incarceration Dummy 0.670*** 0.670* 0.940* 0.633**
[0.194] [0.401] [0.552] [0.286]
Obs 51,742 16,086 16,979 16,416
Clusters 603 324 363 395
Controls: Randomization unit FE, Gender, YOB FE, Sisben score, gender of incarcerated parent, pc,
year of sentence, birth order and year of survey. Column 1 controls add a second order polynomial on
Pc. Sample: Children between 1990 and 2007 who had a convicted parent between ages 0 and 14. SE
in brackets clustered at the randomizarion unit. AR confidence interval result in the same significance
levels.
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Table 2.10: Heterogeneous effects
IV Girls Boys Mother Father
Dep var: Years of education (1) (2) (3) (4)
Parental Inc. 0.359* 0.865*** 0.823** 0.531**
[0.208] [0.286] [0.370] [0.222]
Obs 26310 27086 12049 41319
Child’s age
0-5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years
Parental Inc. 0.673*** 0.384 1.336***
[0.258] [0.330] [0.502]
Obs 18,726 23,634 9,128
Type of crime
Violent Property Drug-related Gun-related
Parental Inc. 1.634 0.485 0.734** 0.542
[1.167] [0.606] [0.361] [0.508]
Obs 9,792 12,985 12,905 9,857
Pooled Pc x x x x
Controls: Randomization unit FE, Gender, YOB FE, Sisben score, gender of in-
carcerated parent, pc, year of sentence, birth order and year of survey. Sample:
Children between 1990 and 2007 who had a convicted parent between ages 0 and
14. SE in brackets clustered at the randomizarion unit.
Table 2.11: Changes after incarceration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep var: LFP spouse Income
score
Years of
educ. HHH
D: Male
HHH
# of people in
HH
D: Lives w/
Grandparents
D: In 2nd
SISBEN
Parental Inc. 0.0680*** -2.365*** 0.103*** -0.0786*** -0.0996*** 0.0196* -0.0303***
[0.0187] [0.193] [0.0300] [0.00604] [0.0303] [0.0110] [0.00492]
Obs 9,673 82,779 82,779 82,779 81,615 16,372 32,881
R-sq 0.22 0.75 0.20 0.19 0.33 0.10 0.08
Mean dep var: 0.399 26.41 5.1 0.595 4.659 0.215 0.242
St dev dep var: 0.49 20.13 2.911 0.491 2.42 0.411 0.428
Panel regressions. Controls: Poverty score, years of education of HHH, Municipality FE and year of survey FE. Dummy for
living with grandparents also includes uncles and cousins. Households with data on both cross-sections of the poverty census
and who had a conviction episode in between surveys. Source: SISBEN and criminal records.
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2.10 List of Figures
Figure 2.1: Prosecution and trial stages
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Source: Colombian Penal proceedings code, Informe de la Comision Asesora de Politica Criminal (2012), SPOA and
Criminal records. The treatment status studied in this paper corresponds to t f , which refers to parents who are not
convicted or free, tc those convicted but not incarcerated, and tI those convicted and incarcerated. Incarceration is a
function of sentence length. Currently, a sentence equal to four years or less is not served in prison.
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Figure 2.2: Incarceration rates
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Source: Criminal records. Selected crimes. I restrict to crimes with at least 100 cases.
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Figure 2.3: Identification: Defendant’s space, judges thresholds and treatment assignment
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A defendant is characterized by a point in the unitary square. A judge is defined by a pair of thresholds along each axis
which determine treatment assignments. Defendants to the left of the conviction threshold are convicted, and those to
the right are freed. Among the convicted, defendants below the incarceration threshold go to prison, and those above
do not.
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Figure 2.4: Identification under 4 types of judges
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The left panel features harsh judges on the conviction margin (Hc). This judges can be harsh (HI) or lenient (LI) on
the incarceration margin. We can identify the causal effect of incarceration for defendants in the shaded area. Those
whose incarceration decision is only a function of judge assignment. The right panel is analogous and it features
lenient judges on the conviction margin (Lc).
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Figure 2.5: Judges’ fixed effects
Source: Attorney General’s office and criminal records. Raw rates are conviction/incarceration averages by judge.
To construct the judge’s fixed effect I take the residual at the judge level after regressing conviction/incarceration
on (demeaned) randomization unit/year dummies, (demeaned) crime-level conviction/incarceration rates, without a
constant.
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Figure 2.6: First stage
Source: Attorney General’s office and criminal records. Raw rates are conviction/incarceration averages by judge.
To construct the judge’s fixed effect I take the residual at the judge level after regressing conviction/incarceration
on (demeaned) randomization unit/year dummys, (demeaned) crime-level conviction/incarceration rates, without a
constant.
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Figure 2.7: Scatter plot: Judges’ fixed effects
Source: Attorney General’s office and criminal records. To construct the judge’s fixed effect I take the residual at the
judge level after regressing conviction/incarceration on (demeaned) randomization unit/year dummies, (demeaned)
crime-level conviction/incarceration rates, without a constant.
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Figure 2.8: Reduced form
Notes: Histogram of parental incarceration judge leniency and the fitted value of local polynomial regressions of
children’s educational attainment on judge stringency. Pooled regression I control for pc.
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Figure 2.9: MTE
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Notes: Following the LIV approach in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) I regress Yeduc= α+β1Pi+
β2P2i +β3X . This graphs plots: β1+2β2Pi for the pooled regression. Controls: Municipality FE,
gender, YOB FE, Sisben score, years of education HH head, years of education of incarecerated
parent, gender of incarcerated parent, pc, year of sentence, birth order and year of survey.
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Figure 2.10: Model of parenting and incarceration
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
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Chapter 3
Identification of treatment effects
3.1 Model
In this chapter, I formalize the previous intuition and extend it to the case of continuous instruments
to deliver a new identification result.
The model is described by the standard IV model, which consists of five main random vari-
ables: T,Z,Y,V,X. Those variables lie in the probability space (Ω,F,P), where individuals are
represented by elements i ∈Ω of the sample space Ω. The variables are defined below:
• Ti denotes the assigned treatment of individual i, and takes values in supp(T ) = {t f , tc, tI}.
t f stands for not convicted, tc for convicted but not incarcerated, and tI for convicted and
incarcerated.
• Zi is the instrumental variable in this analysis and takes values in supp(Z), and represents
judge assignment.
• Yi denotes the outcome of interest for individual i, —e.g., years of education of the child.
• Xi represents the exogenous characteristics of individual i.
• Vi stands for the random vector of unobserved characteristics of individual i, and takes values
in supp(V).
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The random vector V is the source of selection bias in this model. It causes both the treatment T
and outcomeY . The standard IV model is defined by two functions and an independence condition,
as follows:
Outcome Equation: Y = fY (T,X,V,εY ) (3.1)
Treatment Equation: T = fT (Z,X,V) (3.2)
Independence: Z ⊥ (V,εY )|X (3.3)
where εY is an unobserved zero-mean error term associated with the outcome equation.
In this notation, a counterfactual outcome is defined by fixing T to a value t ∈ supp(T ) in the
outcome equation. That is, Y (t) = fY (t,V,X,εY ). The observed outcome for individual i is given
by:
Y = Y (T ) = ∑
t∈{t f ,tc,tI}
Y (t) ·1[T = t]. (3.4)
The independence condition (3.3) implies the following exclusion restriction:
Exclusion Restriction : Z ⊥ Y (t)|X for all t ∈ supp(T ). (3.5)
For the sake of notational simplicity, I suppress exogenous variables X henceforth. All of the
analysis can be understood as conditional on pre-treatment variables.
I assume that the treatment equation is governed by a combination of two threshold-crossing
inequalities. First, there is a conviction stage:

Free if 1[φc(V)> ξc(Z)]
Convicted if 1[φc(V)≤ ξc(Z)]·
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where 1[·] denotes a binary indicator and φc(·),ξc(·) are real-valued functions. Function φc(·) mea-
sures the degree of culpability assessed by the judicial system. This function looks at variables and
information that are not observed by the econometrician but that are observed by the judge, such
as the evidence, crime intensity, effort of the defense and prosecutor lawyers, as well as unob-
served characteristics of the defendant such as aggression, antisocial behavior, etc. The function
ξc(·) assesses judge leniency on conviction. This function can be understood as a threshold of
reasonable doubt beyond which the defendant is convicted by the judge. Judges differ in their
leniency and may set different thresholds for evidence. The judge convicts defendant i whenever
φc(Vi)≤ ξc(Z j). If that is the case, a second stage is held and the judge makes a decision regarding
incarceration:

Not incarcerated if 1[φI(V)> ξI(Z)]
Incarcerated if 1[φI(V)≤ ξI(Z)]
Similarly, φI(V) is a function whose arguments are the case and defendant’s characteristics
relevant for assessment of the punishment level. As before, the judge compares φI(V) to her/his
threshold to incarcerate ξI(Z).
Treatment assignment can be summarized as follows:1
T = fT (Z,V) =

t f if 1[φc(V)> ξc(Z)]
tc if 1[φc(V)≤ ξc(Z)] ·1[φI(V)> ξI(Z)]
tI if 1[φc(V)≤ ξc(Z)] ·1[φI(V)≤ ξI(Z)]
1I assume the following standard regularity conditions: A1) E(|Y (t)|) < ∞ for all t ∈ supp(T ), A2) P(T = t|Z =
z) > 0 for all t ∈ supp(T ) and all z ∈ supp(Z) and, A3) (φc(V),φI(V)) are absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure in R2. The first assumption guarantees the existence of the expectation, the second one assures that
there is a share of the population assigned to each treatment group for every judge, and the third one allows me to
apply the Lebesgue differentiation theorem.
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This model relies on two separable threshold functions that play the role of the monotonicity
condition (Vytlacil, 2002).2 Without loss of generality, it is useful to express treatment assignment
using the following variable transformation:
Uc = Fφ c(V)(φ c(V))∼Uni f [0,1], (3.6)
U I = Fφ I(V)(φ
I(V))∼Uni f [0,1] (3.7)
where FK(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a random variable K. Uc,U I are uni-
formly distributed random variables in [0,1] due to assumption A3, and there is no restriction on
the joint distribution of U I and Uc.
Pc(z) = Fφ c(V)(ξ c(Z));z ∈ supp(Z), (3.8)
PI(z) = Fφ I(V)(ξ
I(Z));z ∈ supp(Z) (3.9)
Let Pc(z) denote the probability of conviction when Z = z. Moreover, independence condition (3.3)
2Consider two judges, j and j′, who see defendants i and i′, who differ in their level of culpability. Say i′ has more
evidence against him than i; namely φc(i′) < φc(i). Suppose that judge j convicts defendant i′ but not i. Then the
threshold function implies that it cannot be the case that judge j′ convicts defendant i, but not i′. More generally, let
Di( j) = 1[Ti( j) = tc] denote the binary indicator that judge j convicts defendant i. Thus if judge j convicts i′ but not
i, it implies:
Di( j)> Di′( j)
Then it cannot be the case that judge j′ convicts defendant i, but not i′. Which means:
Di( j)> Di′( j)→ Di( j′)≥ Di′( j′),
which is equivalent to stating that:
Di( j)> Di( j′)→ Di′( j)≥ Di′( j′).
We can generalize this to all individuals to arrive at the standard monotonicity assumption of Imbens and Angrist
(1994).
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implies Pc,PI ⊥Uc,U I . In this notation, the model can be expressed as:
T ≡ fT (Z,V) = gT (Uc,U I,Pc,PI) =

t f if 1[Uc > Pc(z)]
tc if 1[Uc ≤ Pc(z)] ·1[U I > PI(z)]
tI if 1[Uc ≤ Pc(z)] ·1[U I ≤ PI(z)]
(3.10)
For ease of exposition, I will first explore identification under the assumption thatUc ⊥U I and
then I will go over the results without it. Under the independence assumption we can identify PI(z)
from the data, that is:
P(U I < PI(z)|Uc ≤ Pc(z)) = P(U I < PI(z)) = PI(Z)
The left hand side is observed from the data, the first equality follows directly from the inde-
pendence assumption and the last one the uniform distribution of U I . PI is interpreted as the share
incarcerated.
The goal is to identify and evaluate the treatment effect: E(Y (tI)−Y (tc)) which is a function of
counterfactual variables Y (tI) and Y (tc). To achieve this goal, it is useful to express the observed
expectations in terms of the variables that define the model:
E(Y ·1[T = tc]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI) = (3.11)
= E(Y (tc) ·1[T = tc]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI) (3.12)
= E(Y (tc) ·1[Uc ≤ pc] ·1[U I > pI]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI) (3.13)
= E(Y (tc) ·1[Uc ≤ pc] ·1[U I > pI]) (3.14)
=
∫ pc
0
∫ 1
pI
E(Y (tc)|Uc = uc,U I = uI) fucuI (uc,uI)duc duI (3.15)
(3.16)
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=−
∫ pc
0
∫ pI
0
E(Y (tc)|Uc = uc,U I = uI) fuc,uI (uc,uI)duc duI+ ∫ pc
0
E(Y (tc)|Uc = uc) fuc(uc)duc
Equation (3.12) is an expectation observed in the data. Equality (3.13) comes from the definition
of observed outcomes. Equality (3.14) expresses the indicator 1[T = tc] in terms of the inequalities
of the choice model. Equality (3.15) uses the independence relation Z ⊥ (Uc,U I). Equality (3.16)
expresses the expectation as the integral over the distribution of Uc,U I where fUc,U I(u
c,uI) stands
for the probability density function of Uc,U I at the point (uc,uI), and is equal to one. Equality
(3.19) modifies the integration region. This change is useful to apply the Lebesgue differentiation
theorem next;
∂ 2E(Y ·1[T = tc]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI)
∂ pc∂ pI
=−E(Y (tc)|Uc = pc,U I = pI) (3.17)
Equality (3.17) arises as a direct application of the Lebesgue differentiation theorem. What this
result gives me is a connection between the observed outcomes and the targeted counterfactual
outcome. We can use the same steps applied to counterfactual Y (tc) to obtain the counterfactual
for Y (tI). Combining these two I obtain:
∂ 2E(Y ·1[T ∈ {tc, tI}]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI)
∂ pc∂ pI
= E(Y (tI)−Y (tc)|Uc = pc,U I = pI) (3.18)
In the language of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), Eq.3.18 defines the marginal treatment effect
(MTE) of outcome Y with respect to treatment assignment tc and tI . It is interpreted as the causal
effect of incarceration versus conviction only, for the share of defendants whose culpability and
punishment assessments, Uc and U I respectively, is set at quantiles pc and pI . The derivative
in Equation (3.16) traces the MTE of incarceration relative to conviction throughout the unitary
square of Uc,U I . This result is an application of Lee and Salanie (2018) and extends the result
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of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999). In Appendix B I explain graphically the intuition of this result.
The main idea is that changes in Pc and PI affect exogenously treatment assignment. Then, by
examining the derivative of the outcome variables with respect to Pc and PI , we capture how the
outcome variable changes when treatment changes at each point in the space of the unobservable
confounding variables.
The average treatment effect (ATE) is the causal effect of tc and tI on Y in the population, and
it corresponds to the integral of the MTE over the support of Uc and U I .
E(Y (tI)−Y (tc)) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∂ 2E(Y ·1[T ∈ {tc, tI}]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI)
∂ pc∂ pI
dpcdpI (3.19)
Without the assumption of independence of Uc and U I , variation in PI is only identified once I
fix the conviction threshold. Thus, the counterfactual of interest is now: Y (tI) and Y (tc) for those
who were convicted under Pc = pc. This means the objective is to identify causal effects of the
form: E(Y (tI)−Y (tc)|Uc < pc), which is the the same exercise explained in Section 4.1. Let:
E(Y ·1[T = tc]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI,Uc < pc) = (3.20)
= E(Y (tc) ·1[T = tc]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI,Uc < pc) (3.21)
= E(Y (tc) ·1[U I > pI]|Pc(Z) = pc,PI(Z) = pI,Uc < pc) (3.22)
= E(Y (tc) ·1[U I > pI]|Uc < pc) (3.23)
Where I followed the same steps as before. Let:
P∗I = Pr[U
I < PI|Uc < Pc] = G(PI) (3.24)
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P∗I is the object I observe so I will define the observed expectations in terms of this variable:3
E(Y (tc) ·1[U I > G−1(p∗I |Uc < pc]|Uc < pc) (3.25)∫ 1
P∗I
E(Y (tc)|U I = uI,Uc < pc) fuI∗ |Uc<pc(p∗I )duI (3.26)
And applying the Lebesgue differentiation theorem this results in:
∂E(Y ·1[T ∈ {tc}]|pc, pI,Uc < pc)
∂ pI∗
=−E(Y (tc)|U I = pI,Uc < pc) fuI |Uc<pc(p∗I ) (3.27)
And ultimately;
E(Y (tI)−Y (tc)|Uc < pc) =
∫ 1
0
∂E(Y ·1[T ∈ {tc, tI}]|Pc(Z) = pc,P∗I (Z) = p∗I ,Uc < pc)
∂ p∗I
dp∗I (3.28)
What this result says is that we can trace the treatment effect of incarceration relative to convic-
tion once we fix a threshold for conviction. We do this by evaluating the changes on the outcome
variable when we change P∗I . This delivers the MTE along the unobservable dimensionU I|Uc<Pc.
The integral over the support of the instrument gives the LATE, or the ATE when the instrument
has full support.
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